This document summarizes essential recommendations developed by participants at the 2002 Olympic Security Review Conference. A more detailed document is available at the Oquirrh Institute, 299 South Main Street, Suite 1700, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
The Oquirrh Institute

The Oquirrh Institute was launched in Salt Lake City, Utah during the 2002 Olympic Winter Games. Organized as a 501(c) (3) non-profit, the organization is devoted to guiding enlightened public policy in an era of constant technological change. The word Oquirrh comes from the Goshute Indian language and describes the early light that shines on the western mountains as the morning sun first appears. The concept describes well the Institute’s mission of shining early light on emerging public policy dilemmas and then establishing innovative solutions to those problems. The Institute has four main areas of concentration:

• New models of governance made necessary by information technology
• Competency Measured Education
• Increasing the speed and decreasing the costs of environmental progress
• The sociology of interoperability in homeland security

The founders of the institute represent corporate, government, and educational organizations from throughout the United States who share the belief that prosperity in the 21st century will require public policy to adapt as rapidly as technology changes our world. Thirteen members take pride in being the Board of Trustees and contribute new insights and approaches to our future development. They are:

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 16, 1995, Salt Lake City was announced as the host city for the XIX Olympic Winter Games in 2002. Upon receiving the bid, public safety agencies spent seven years preparing the State of Utah, Salt Lake City, and the surrounding areas for the Winter Games. The seventeen-day event covered over 7000 square miles and was seen by more than 2 million spectators, 3 billion viewers, 13,000 media representatives, and 2500 competitors.

Being the first major event after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, the Games quickly became our nation’s first homeland security effort. No significant security incidents occurred during the Games. This success coupled with our unique model provides us with an opportunity to share valuable information with others.

In October, the Oquirrh Institute held the 2002 Olympic Security Review Conference to determine what went well and what could have been done more effectively. Keynote speaker, Peter J. Ryan, Commissioner, New South Wales Police and Chief Security Advisor, International Olympic Committee for the Athens Games reflected on his 40 years in law enforcement and articulated the reasons why security of a major event can also be an exercise of national security. In his keynote address, Ibrahim A. Karawan, Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Utah eloquently presented six arguments to help participants understand the mindset, defining characteristics, and the logic of strategic action pursued by militant Islamist groups.

Sixty participants from the private sector and from the local, state, and federal public safety community attended the conference. They identified seven principles learned from the Olympics that can be applied to homeland security. The seven principles are:

- Blend Central Coordination with Local Control
- Build an Institutional Framework - the Bricks
- Build Social Capital - the Mortar
- Rely On Networks, Not On a Mainframe
- Use Risk Assessments
- Integrate Homeland Security Into All Public Safety Activity
- Make Haste, But With Deliberation

The information contained in this document provides a basic understanding of what was learned from the winter games and how the lessons learned can be used to better protect our nation’s home front.
BACKGROUND

The XIX Olympic Winter Games were awarded to Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 16, 1995. Public safety agencies spent seven years getting ready for the 2002 Winter Games. The goal was three-fold:

- Protect the Games from undetermined risks
- Develop and implement a plan that used resources responsibly to protect the Games and the communities in Utah
- Maintain an environment consistent with the spirit of the Games and the image of the United States

Staging the event involved thousands of employees and volunteers and required a budget of around $1.3 billion. The event involved more than 2,500 competitors from close to eighty nations and thousands of officials and others from around the world. There were over two million spectators and three billion viewers for the seventeen days of events. Media coverage included 9,000 accredited and over 4,000 unaccredited representatives who came to Utah to report on the Games. There were more than 150 Olympic events in seven sports and 34 events in four sports for the Paralympics. The Olympic theater was a zone of operations that covered more than 7,000 square miles.

THE CONFERENCE

The Olympic Security Review Conference was held October 24 and 25, 2002, at the Governor’s Mansion, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Conference sponsors include the Markle Foundation, Siebel Systems, and the Utah Department of Public Safety. More than sixty participants from the private sector and from the state, local, and federal public safety community attended. Most of the participants were people who played a central role in developing and executing the Olympic security plan.

“The lessons learned from Olympic security operations, for any nation, can have a huge impact on national security. They should be preserved, absorbed, and further developed,” explained keynote speaker Peter J. Ryan, Commissioner, New South Wales Police and Chief Security Advisor, International Olympic Committee for the Athens’ Games. He emphasized that security operations for the Games has traditionally been designed to defend against internal or external terrorist attacks. Whereas, traditional national defense has been to principally defend against conventional military attack. In its most simple description, the security operations for Olympic Games test every plan for every contingency.

To help participants understand the mindset, strategic beliefs and choices of militant leaders, Ibrahim A. Karawan, Director of the Middle East Center at the University of
Utah eloquently presented six logics that can have significant explanatory and possibly predictive power with regard to strategies pursued by militant Islamist groups. “One should understand the strategic beliefs and choices of militant leaders regarding notions of time, reliance on small numbers, modalities or recruitment, funding sources, fronts of action, and provoking their adversaries to overreact to violence in ways that may produce quagmire” stated Dr. Karawan. He predicts that things will get tougher before they get better regarding the threats posed by these groups.

The aim of the conference was to review the lessons learned about security and to determine what aspects of those lessons are applicable to homeland security. It examined what was gained, what worked during the planning and operations phases, and what could have been done more effectively. Participants outlined how the Olympics and homeland security are alike, how they are different, and identified seven security lessons that could apply to homeland security.

The 2002 Winter Games was our nation’s first significant homeland security operation. Therefore, the conference was not just about looking at the past but also about identifying the lessons that are useful for the future.
THE LESSONS LEARNED
HOW THE OLYMPICS AND HOMELAND SECURITY ARE ALIKE

All Olympic incidents were local incidents first. All homeland security incidents also affect local communities first. Securing the homeland starts from the bottom up. This means local efforts are an integral part of any national security effort.

Both the Olympics and homeland security require coordination among all public safety disciplines, all levels of government, and the private sector. Both types of security operations require an effective way to share information that is timely, accurate, usable, and secure.

Security risks can never be completely eliminated and therefore must be managed. The resources to manage risks for the Olympics and homeland security are scarce and need to be shared with everyone. Because of this both operations require a way to determine how to best allocate and share resources. Resource allocation should be based on formal risk assessments. Such assessments will provide a common baseline to help decision makers decide where limited resources can do the most good.

HOW THE OLYMPICS AND HOMELAND SECURITY ARE DIFFERENT

The Olympics and homeland security differ in their time-life. The Olympics had a fixed start and end date. Homeland security is a marathon that has no finish line.

Resources are allocated specifically for the Games and are not shared with other competing events. Resources for homeland security have to be shared among 50 competing states.

During the Olympics, many public safety people worked exclusively on the Games. This model does not lend itself to homeland security because it is not an isolated event. Homeland security has to be integrated into the daily routine for public safety personnel. By integrating homeland security and public safety into the same routine we can secure the homeland and not assign personnel additional assignments.

The Olympic mission was clear. There also were clear measures upon which to determine success. The mission for homeland security at the national, state and local level and how to measure its success should be clearly defined.
THE SEVEN SECURITY LESSONS LEARNED FROM HOSTING THE 2002 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES

Participants at the 2002 Olympic Security Review Conference\(^1\) identified seven principles from the Utah Olympic experience that can be applied to homeland security. Those lessons address the importance of both the sociology and technological aspects of security.

**Lesson One: BLEND CENTRAL COORDINATION WITH LOCAL CONTROL**

Operations should be coordinated centrally but local communities and agencies should remain in charge of carrying out the operations. Federal, state, and local agencies were all involved in security operations. Important to the coordination effort was to clearly define the role for each discipline while providing local agencies the ability to control and implement operations within their jurisdictions.

The Utah Public Safety Command (UOPSC) was the central coordinating group for Olympic Security. It was created by state statute and included representatives from state, local and federal agencies, and from the private sector. Their job was to coordinate the entire security operation and to provide the communications link between independent groups.

Coordination can be prescribed by government mandates or technological requirements established by vendors. Coordination can also emerge, take hold, and grow from successful practices of on-going collaborative efforts.

The key to making the central coordination and local control process work effectively is a communication system that allowed information to be shared across all affected disciplines.

**How can this lesson be applied to homeland security?**

- Coordinate homeland security centrally, through for example a shared set of standards, and allow states, local communities, and agencies to remain in charge of implementation and how operations are carried out
- Share successful and best practices and allow states, local communities, and agencies to adopt what works for them in the uniqueness of their home environment
- Provide capacity to communicate across all affected disciplines and the private sector
- Encourage collaborative efforts

\(^{1}\) Held October 24-25, 2002 to review the lessons learned about security from the Games and to determine what aspects of those lessons can be applied to homeland security. The conference was a project of the Oquirrh Institute and its Center for Olympic and Special Events Security.
Lesson Two: BUILD AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK- THE BRICKS

One cannot legislate coordination, but one can institutionalize it. The Olympics had a statute that governed what the Command did, who would be a part of it, and how it worked. That law provided an institutional and behavioral framework, or the “bricks,” for the Olympic operation that provided opportunities for developing policies, defining role responsibility, and building trust.

The model worked well for a number of reasons. First the model provided a laboratory to explore a variety of command, control and coordination mechanisms. Second the command became an effective coordinating group because it included representatives from state, local and federal agencies and from the private sector. Examples of membership include:

- Law enforcement
- Fire department
- Emergency medical services
- Emergency management
- Public works
- National Guard

An institutional framework provides a formal structure within which outcome-oriented guidelines to states and communities can be developed. At the same time, the framework should be flexible enough to allow local variations about how the standards and guidelines are implemented.

**How can this lesson be applied to homeland security?**

- Create an integrated model and seek inclusive participation for planning and operations
  - The central coordinating body should include a variety of public and private sector agencies; be comprehensive and inclusive, yet small enough to be effective
- Develop outcome-oriented guidelines to states and communities
  - The framework should be flexible to allow local variations about how the standards and guidelines are implemented
  - Leaders should identify the results they want and allow the experts to determine how best to achieve them
- Establish a clear mission for homeland security on the national, state, and local level
  - Develop outcomes and measures for success

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2 Title 53, Chapter 12, Utah Code; The Utah Olympic Public Safety Command
Lesson Three: BUILD SOCIAL CAPITAL-THE MORTAR

Structure has to be present, but it is effective relationships that carry the day. An organization like UOPSC can be created, but its culture has to grow. Social capital is a shorthand way of thinking about relationships.

Social capital is the “mortar” that holds together the institutional “bricks” of homeland security. It is the product of networking, team building, and other trust-building activities. With a deep reserve of social capital among the public and private sectors in homeland security, institutional frameworks are more meaningful and productive. Social capital allows people and organizations to trust one another and cooperate. It is built from communication and from shared experiences, processes, and activities.

Social capital was built during the years Utah spent planning for the Games. The trust that was created helped public safety personnel identify and solve problems rapidly during the Olympic operation.

A formal structure, such as our state statute, that requires the coordination of state and local law enforcement and public safety agencies helped build trust among participating agencies by defining the roles for each entity. Many agencies initially were suspicious about the role others would play, but by clearly defining the role of state and local agencies sufficient trust was built to enable common interests to be identified, resources to be allocated equitably, and additional support to be provided as needed.

How can this lesson be applied to homeland security?

- Meet the challenge to foster social capital, vertically and horizontally, among the agencies, interest groups, and the private sector that have not traditionally been a part of security operations
  - Use a formal structure or framework to provide opportunities to develop trust and build working relationships
  - Provide opportunities to communicate, share experiences, processes, and activities
  - Clearly define the roles for each agency and the private sector
Lesson Four: RELY ON NETWORKS, NOT ON A MAINFRAME

The organizational structure of homeland security should resemble a network of personal computers rather than a mainframe. Utilize networks to decentralize system components to create a robust environment. Focus on improving and integrating existing systems rather than building massive new systems. Those involved in homeland security must fight a networked enemy. Therefore, a networked defense is needed. Build a network of networks.

A networked system eliminates a single point of failure for the entire system. For example, if one component of the system fails, the rest of the system continues to operate. Utah built the Olympic plan on systems and procedures that it knew already worked. There were multiple systems and they did not all do things the same way.

Access to information improves because its delivery is spread across the network. A central mainframe—meaning a central decision-making group—is not the only place where information is generated or resides. Agencies have the added benefit of sharing information amongst themselves on a network.

Participation by local and state agencies increases because the system allows local control of information. Agencies are able to select who has authorization to what level of information.

How does this lesson apply to homeland security?

- Organizational structure should resemble a network of personal computers
- Build a networked defense without a single point of failure
- Foster social capital and encourage agencies to participate and share information across the network
- Build upon existing systems and procedures
Lesson Five: USE RISK ASSESSMENTS

Utah’s aim during the Games was to manage risk. It recognized that risk can never be eliminated. Utah’s strategy was to determine the risks and then develop a reasonable and effective security plan, commensurate with the expected threat level, with what had been done in prior major events, and within its resources.

Utah’s risk assessment approach provided a method for identifying the most significant risks and to allocate resources based on reducing those risks. Another planning method is to use a resource-based approach that plans the security event around the amount of resources available. However, by using this method the available resources may not be capable of lowering the amount of risk to an acceptable level. Hence, the overall risk to an event will be higher if additional resources are not allocated.

Even with the many assets available for homeland security, the demand for resources to reduce risks will be greater than can be met. A common methodology of assessing the level and content of risk is important and allows ranking of significance across threat areas.

How can this lesson be applied to homeland security?

Use risk assessments to allocate homeland security resources. This approach can help in that scarce resources are being used where they can do the most good.

- Develop a common methodology to assess the level, content, and rank of risk
Lesson Six: INTEGRATE HOMELAND SECURITY INTO ALL PUBLIC SAFETY ACTIVITY

Homeland security is a state of mind, an attitude that is integrated into everything that public safety does. It augments and makes jobs easier. Homeland security cannot be an additional assignment for public safety personnel to increase their daily workload and professional responsibility.

Homeland security is a scaleable response model that incorporates the small-scale everyday duties up to the large-scale multi-agency terrorist response. Daily public safety routines provide homeland security on its smallest scale and can quickly be enlarged and expanded into large-scale multi-agency terrorist responses.

First responders have changed their day-to-day routine, have improved skills, more understanding, and better capabilities now than before. On-site risk assessments are now a routine part of an everyday call. Hazardous material teams automatically respond to calls with public safety.

Utah’s command structures are different than they were before the Games. Multi-agency responses integrate resources and are coordinated by a single command. Agencies pull together daily for special events and quickly coordinate into an incident command system where the lead agency acts as the command and others serve in supporting positions.

How can this lesson be applied to homeland security?

- Insure that all public safety agencies understand the role they play in helping secure the homeland
- Encourage multi-agency public safety responses to function within an incident management system
- Share successful best practices
Lesson Seven: MAKE HASTE, BUT WITH DELIBERATION

Public safety spent seven years planning the 17-day Olympic event and employed a thoughtful and deliberate process. Technology is available today to network systems, share information, and enhance communications. But, it takes time to get people to work together and to build trusting relationships. Developing national guidelines for what information will be shared is important and will depend not only on the technology but on the sociology of human relationships. We are more ready today to meet the terrorist threat than we were a year ago. But we have more to do.

How does this lesson apply to homeland security?

Recognize that we have become more secure as a nation. But also understand that there is more to do.

- Build on local, state, and national successes
- Acknowledge that many of the old ways of providing public safety services will have to evolve into more multi-agency, collaborative efforts
- Both technology and sociology of security is important for a successful security plan
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Impossible, complicated, difficult, challenging, complex and technologically advanced...these are all descriptions used to explain the intricacies of planning security for the Olympic Games. Indeed it is all of these and more. Given recent world events of the past 18 months, the task has become even more complex. In many presentations I have made on Olympic Security, I have stressed the fact that each Games event builds upon the experience of the last and the thinking and technology probably pushes frontiers in both management of the issue and the development of the sophisticated technological support employed by security forces.

Please bear with me for a few moments whilst I reflect on my past 40 years in law enforcement. From the early 1960’s my professional life has been strongly influenced by the political response to world tensions. The UK was in the forefront of the NATO strategic response to the threat of war with the Soviet Union. We were, as both police officers and members of the Army reserve forces, constantly training and re-training for what we believed to be the inevitable devastating atomic, then nuclear, bomb attack by the former Soviet Union against cities in Britain. We trained to maintain government and the rule of law, to evacuate and relocate the civilian survivors and to fight in the streets against the invading Red Army. In the scenarios against which we trained, my role also changed as I rose through the ranks of the British Police Service, until I too was included in the perhaps not so lucky group who would be protected in nuclear shelters built to house the interim governments to lead recovery after the war. This training, modified to take account of changing strategy and technology, continued right up until the decline of the Soviet Union in 1990.

Meanwhile, things had changed in other areas. The IRA had brought their bombing campaign to the British mainland and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups conducted bomb attacks and other outrages on the streets of London. Countermeasures and consequence management for all of these had to be accommodated in the training regime of the police. We were protecting the country.

I mention these things to draw the connection to protection of the Olympic Games in the present day. The Olympic Games are a celebration of human achievement, of sporting prowess and the non-sectarian, non-political ideal of the “brotherhood of man.” In more recent times, the promotion of artistic and intellectual excellence has been introduced to
further promote the Olympic ideal. Of course there is huge national pride at stake and intense competition to be the country with the most medals or the fastest athletes, but with some minor exceptions, antipathies are put to one side in pursuit of the Olympic ideal.

Why then have we turned the security of such a worthy event into an exercise of national security? The reason, Munich 1972, which shattered, perhaps forever, the Olympic truce, known since ancient times in Greece as, “Ekecheiria,” where warring states would lay down their arms for seven days prior to, during and seven days after the Olympic Games. September 2001 has re-focused this exercise into a true national security response.

The concentration of effort required now to produce an Operational Security Plan for the Olympic Games is truly Herculean in scale. Planning for security commences years ahead of the event, involves several hundred people, and takes on a form which is probably not repeated in any other public event. Yes, sure, as law enforcement or security experts, we have planned for and implemented large security tasks. A Formula One Grand Prix, Presidential or Head-of-State visits, large-scale public meetings or demonstrations, etc., are all in the regular planning requirements for government and law enforcement agencies. The Olympic Games, however, are the equivalent of ten Grand Finals a day for 16 days, spread over huge cities filled with people moving about between venues, watching or attending public entertainment events, for almost 24 hours a day. Many heads of state (some of whom require very high levels of protection) move among these spectators, often in a fairly random manner. You can throw in the occasional strike, public demonstration or protest for good measure. Airport arrivals and departures, and baggage handling on a grand scale stretch our immigration and customs procedures. For a law enforcement and security agency, the Olympic operational period is 60 days, involving in the case of Athens, 50,000 security personnel at peak times. Wars have been planned and executed in less time and with less people.

So let me link this to homeland security, which might be called something else in another country, but the principle is the same.

As I mentioned earlier, a security plan on the Olympic scale is directly related to the national defense of any host country. Some nations (the United States for example and some European nations, on a lesser scale) already have massive self-defense mechanisms. Their huge military establishments included well-equipped and trained police forces and government agencies dedicated to keeping the country safe and the enemy at bay. Of course, this huge effort is not universal and some countries are quite weak and vulnerable.

But the traditional national defense has been principally to defend against conventional
military attack, not necessarily against internal or external terrorist attack. The security operations for the Olympic Games are in fact, exactly designed to do just that, and much more. It simply tests every plan we have for every contingency. The lessons from this for any nation must be preserved and absorbed and developed further. National Security now begins on the streets of our cities, the ports and airports, and vulnerable borders which all nations have.

Looking at those Olympic Games in which I have first-hand experience, I can say that the arrangements for security have made a huge and lasting impact on national security. In Australia, for example, there was in existence a well-rehearsed national anti-terrorist plan which was designed to involve all agencies at state and federal level.

In the buildup to the Games, we conducted huge exercises to test the validity of the plan in an Olympic context, even against the likelihood of a chemical/biological attack on a stadium. Through the planning, we found that the key senior people who would be involved in a live incident had never tested the plan. My role as the Commissioner of Police, those of senior federal and state cabinet members including the Prime Minister, had never actually taken part in a recent exercise. The planners had made assumptions as to the information requirement and decision tree that these top-level people would employ. Some of these assumptions, made in good faith, were misguided. In the exercises, the real people performed their roles; and the decision levels, operating procedures, information flow, and communication paths were modified.

The exercises highlighted deficiencies in our operational response. The special air service (SAS) of the defense forces formed and trained an additional anti-terrorist squadron, and they also developed a capability to board large ships underway at sea. The country had very limited capability to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident and this gap was closed by an intensive program of training and equipment purchase including the medical and public health response mechanisms. These changes and improvements alone cost tens of millions of dollars. These and many other changes took place, which have all been a tremendous legacy for the ability of Australia to deal with the present and future threats of global or domestic terrorism.

In the case of Greece, the geophysical and geopolitical location of the country present considerably more risks than a country which holds the Games in the center of its mainland, accessible only by road and air (with both routes being subject to tight control as was applied in Salt Lake). The Australian location was geographically isolated, making it possible to have strict control over the relatively few accessible ports of entry. The borders of Greece are very difficult to police. It has a huge coastline with hundreds of small ports and easily accessible beaches, porous land borders with relatively unstable countries in the Balkans and a known, huge illegal immigration problem.
The divergence of terrorism, its links to organized crime, and the sheer ruthlessness of action displayed in today’s environment places a strain on the ability to track all possible threats. During the Olympic Games, the world comes to the host country and could bring with it problems from their own country of origin. Many of these countries are politically or economically unstable and have their own or house other active terrorist groups, particularly nations in Africa and Southeast Asia. The concern is not simply a likely attack on our own homeland but an event aimed at others that takes place in our homeland.

The emergence of extreme right- and left-wing issue groups in Europe, some claiming the name of former high-profile terrorist groups, is a new problem to consider as well as the many faces of global religion-based terrorism which, although operating under different names, are fundamentally linked in their objective. To prepare for all these possibilities, the host country actually pulls together all agencies dealing with national security under one roof to assess the risk to the Olympic Games. Why not work like that all the time instead of in silos?

Therefore, the Olympic Security operation is a de facto national security response. It cannot be anything else. Fluttering like a flag in the storm of world events and politics, the security response has to adapt to the rapidly changing environment instantaneously. Plans have to change, assumptions must be reconsidered, and tasks must be redefined. We do this constantly in our Olympic planning and it should be so for the broader national picture. The preparations for the Games and the investment in security infrastructure will be an enormous legacy for the country and its national security capability after the Games are over. This opportunity should not be wasted.

As an exercise in testing cooperation, there is no better context than the Olympic security operation. Every government agency is involved, at national and local levels. Local police have to work with both the public and private sector and tensions can be high as each protects self-interest, industrial secrets and role primacy. However, at the end of the day (and sometimes getting to this point is painful), the police have primacy in the command and control coordination area and the other agencies each retain their important roles and exercise their professional responsibilities in the areas in which they are competent.

There is no room for interagency jealousy and non-cooperation; people’s lives are at stake, and national security is at risk. But inter-agency rivalry does exist, people do not cooperate as they should, and information is not freely exchanged. If all goes well, the extent of this is never an issue; but should an incident occur which could have been prevented by better communication and cooperation, the public will hold someone accountable.
Dealing with public perceptions, fears, and expectations is a critical task. The public can be quickly frightened, which in turn defines their behavior. Witness the massive worldwide drop in air travel after September 11 and the fear of plague among mailroom workers worldwide following the anthrax scare. We need to think through our communication and information policies very carefully indeed. In whom are we trying to put the fear of dread by our actions—the man and woman in the street or the terrorist? We really do need to gain public acceptance for our strategies. Throughout the Olympic planning and operational stages, we try to encourage a sensible but truthful strategy to reassure the public and encourage attendance. This strategy should continue in these uncertain days to reduce fear in the population.

So what are the lessons we can learn?

We must:

- Establish clear mission targets
- Define operational concepts
- Engage in thorough planning
- Encourage interagency cooperation and joint training
- Involve and liaise with the private sector
- Agree on a clear definition of roles and responsibilities
- Manage conflict
- Characterize risk parameters
- Target investment, particularly toward joint information and communication systems to manage the intelligence and share its product
- Promote international cooperation to target terrorist groups and track funding
- Seek public acceptance of policies to protect the country
Violence As A Strategic Choice: The Case of Militant Islamist Groups

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It is important at the outset to make two sets of distinctions. The first distinction is between Islamic groups (which focus on individual redemption and social reform) and Islamist groups (which focus on gaining state power). The second distinction is between political Islamist groups (who use peaceful means to obtain power) and militant Islamist groups or MIGs (who strive to seize state power through violent means).

Much has been written since September 11 about threats posed by militant Islamist groups (MIGs) like Al Qaeda. CIA Director Tenet described them before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2001 as representing the “most immediate threat to U.S. national security.” Like other groups that rely on violence, MIGs do not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, the military and the civilians, or the few who may be guilty and the many who are decidedly innocent. Creating a climate of fear and uncertainty to paralyze their opponents through violent means has become a key strategic objective for them.

Like other violent groups, MIGs justify their actions under the category of the “absence of alternatives.” They insist that those in positions of power and dominance in nation-states and the international system as a whole, will never respond to peaceful marches, legal petitions, political practices, humanitarian appeals, or eloquent statements. Those in positions of power and dominance will have to be eradicated through a combative insurrectional approach. For them, the main feature of the setting in which their “struggle” is launched is not exactly the abundance of available options but the absence of alternatives to violence as a strategy.

Any strategy of confronting the MIGs requires understanding their mindset, their defining characteristics, and the logic of strategic action pursued by them. The fact that they claim to act in the name of religion does not mean that analysts of their actions should look for clues in religious texts. Such search for the so-called essence of Islam is nothing but an exercise in futility. “Islamic arguments” may be used to justify and to critique some diametrically opposed positions. Islam has generated over many centuries a vast body of texts, scholarship, and judgments through which rival actors can search and find support for contradictory positions on war and peace as well as violence and co-existence. Militant groups use parts from the Qur’an to legitimize their actions in their societies. However, their conclusions and positions were considered to be misguided and distorted by many Islamic thinkers.
Rather than looking at certain religious texts for explanations of militant actions, one should examine the strategic beliefs and choices of militant leaders regarding notions of time, reliance on small numbers, modalities of recruitment, funding sources, fronts of action, and provoking their adversaries to overreact to violence in ways that may produce quagmire. It is important to recall that the MIGs are highly centralized and personalized. Understanding the mindset or the operational code of the few at the top of their pyramids of power can have significant explanatory and possibly predictive power with regard to their strategies. Let me look briefly here at six arguments before making a few predictions.

FIRST: THE LOGIC OF SHRINKING TIME

Even though the MIGs share with the political Islamists the objective of gaining power and building Islamic regimes, they use violent means in ways that reflect their own sense of the urgency of direct confrontational action. They have a particular sense of time (to be found in the statements of Sayyid Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, among others) that sees Islam as facing a cluster of grave dangers from within and from without, cultural, political and economic marginalization, identity distortion, as well as subservience to the West.

According to these militant perspectives, if such trends continue, the menace they pose to Islamic beliefs and values will become enormous and the repercussions can be catastrophic. It is similar to the image of five minutes to midnight, an image that requires not an incremental action, but uncompromising Rage for God. From such a perspective, the option of doing nothing is similar to working within existing systems of domination: a non-starter. Even if militant actions did not produce the intended results, its success in creating a climate of fear and unpredictability is desirable according to their strategists.

This is a distinct militant perspective and not an Islamist one in general. Political Islamists like the Muslim Brothers, for instance, have a different assessment of the time dimension as it relates to their strategic choices. In fact, they believe that time has worked in their own favor and that Islamist reliance on violence is both unwarranted and counterproductive. Nasser in Egypt, Bourgiba in Tunisia, Atatourk in Turkey, and the Shah of Iran, the Muslim Brothers have argued, tried to weaken the social and political influence of the Islamic movements and ideas in their societies, but they failed drastically.

However, the leaders of the MIGs insist that the key criteria of success for them is not to see more bearded young men going to newly built mosques, or to see more women wearing veils in public places, or to have six or seven of every ten books published in this Arab country or the other deal with Islamic topics. For them, the real and central task is to seize state power and establish Islamic systems because without that, the passing of time will pose grave threats to the Islamic beliefs and interests. This is why they
believe in what is known as hatmiyat al-muwajahah or inevitability of confrontation according to a member of the Jihad group and former colonel in the Egyptian Military Intelligence, Abboud al-Zumur. Combative action is unavoidable as far as the MIGs are concerned. Compromising strategies such as working within the existing systems or competing with non-Islamist forces through elections are both delusional and deviationist.

SECOND: THE LOGIC OF SMALL NUMBERS

Most of the MIGs are composed of a small number of cadres relative to the military and security institutions they have to confront. Clearly, one has to take into consideration that while the cadres that implement their strategy of violence are a tiny minority, others are involved in the process in the areas of planning, funding, intelligence, and training, among the activities necessary for the functioning of these groups. Even with taking that into account, memoirs of militant leaders and estimates by security agencies agree that their numbers have been small. In most cases, these groups were not willing to trust much more potential recruits whom they might have suspected as possible infiltrators working for the enemy, the state security.

Militant groups find in their small numbers an evidence of the ideological correctness of their central cause as a “believing minority” or a “Quranic generation of a new type” in the image of the early Muslims during the foundation period of Islam. This vanguard, as described by Sayyed Qutb, who ended up as a leading ideologue of Islamic militancy, has to be composed of the select few who know what nobody else knows. It is a dedicated vanguard that directs the struggle not according to what the masses may want at a given moment in time, but in pursuit of what they ought to have wanted, but did not. Such vanguard is a minority that can be trusted to be the true Muslims who act as fighters at a critical stage when strong loyalty is more important than large numbers.

Small numbers are not only ideologically correct, but they also provide certain strategic and tactical advantages. They can hide in a sea of millions and tens of millions. It may be difficult for state authorities to strike at these small numbers with a high degree of precision and when they do miss, they can pay a heavy political price. Small numbers of militant cadres and their handlers can inflict heavy human and economic losses, as the events of September 11 and the cases of Algeria and Egypt have demonstrated already.

THIRD: THE LOGIC OF RECRUITMENT

Most of the leaders of the MIGs have been recipients of modern, not religious education. Salih Sariyah has received a Ph.D degree in educational science, Ayman al-Zawahiri is an MD, Magdi al-Safti of “Those Who Have Been Saved From Hell” was an MD too, Osama bin Laden studied civil engineering and public administration, Mohamed Atta, who played an important role in the September 11 operation, has studied
computer sciences. Very few philosophy, sociology, or political science majors managed to join the MIGs or to be among their top leaders!

Their familiarity with the modern sciences and their ideological commitment give them a sense of not being that intimidated by the West. For them the package of the West is divisible, not indivisible. They can deal with Western science and excel in it and at the same time reject Western value systems in their entirety. Recent recruitment of members seems to value those with scientific background, use computers, and know foreign languages. This is necessary to do research on the internet or know which airport has a low security record. They are sent to their ultimate targets after some exposure to similar environments, such as sending some cadres with no known record of involvement in violence to European countries first before forwarding them to the United States in the case of the September 11 operation.

MIGs are centered around one individual at the top of the hierarchy but with separate “one man think tanks” who report directly to the leader to maximize operational secrecy, without significant institutionalization of decision making. Those leaders are often upper-middle-class types who engage in these activities because they want to, not because they have to do it from a socio-economic vantage point. Special operations like September 11 have their arrangements outside the regular organizational structure.

The mechanisms of member recruitment are kinship, friendship and worship plus regional and tribal affiliations. They are marked by the politicization of religiosity over a period of time. The operational principle of the MIGs is that they are looking for a select few. Obviously, one does not apply to join these MIGs, but when one arrives, he is approached and tested more than once before joining the group. There is recruitment of individuals and cooptation of whole groups. It started with the war in Afghanistan when militant groups from Egypt and Algeria were “leased” by Bin Laden. His group provided the funding and the zeal. The leaders of the Egyptian MIGs provided the strategic thinking and the training. The outcome was a cartel of sorts. Each side had what the other lacked. As the Saudi state hires experts in development, the MIGs hire experts in violence to plan attacks and fight way beyond the borders of their country.

FOURTH: THE LOGIC OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF FUNDING

At the beginning of the Islamist resurgence, particularly after the oil boom, militant groups relied on state funding from one Muslim country or another. They learned quickly that it was a risky enterprise to depend on such aid. More prudent from their perspective was to rely on remittances from their members and sympathizers working in the oil-producing countries in the Middle East. Remittances were not subjected to restrictions. The amount of resources involved was huge. If those sending money sent back only 10% of their incomes, the revenues generated would have been significant in
funding Jihad, buying weapons, supporting families of imprisoned members, and so on.

Donations for the Muslim fighters in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir, or Palestine in response to a wave of publicity and agitation about the religious duty to give in order to end the suffering of innocent Muslims in one of these places can produce good results in terms of revenues. Of course, there is no way to verify that the money would not be used for other purposes. This constant state of fundraising has been going on in supermarkets, sports clubs, banks and business institutions. It is important to remember that contributing or tabarau’ is one of the ways of deleting sins in preparation for the Day of Judgment. Another possible way is fasting. For many, financial contribution to Islamic charity organizations is often seen as easier than the alternative!

FIFTH: THE LOGIC OF SHIFTING FRONTS

The MIGs move from national to international contexts based on expediency or an assessment of the strategic situation they face. Here is one example from the Middle East: During the period of 1979-1982, the hopes of the leaders of the MIGs got high as the acts of Islamist militancy escalated in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. Other cases of militancy have materialized in Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, and Algeria over the following two decades. However, the dominos expected to fall into the hands of the MIGs did not fall. The states targeted by their campaigns proved to be more resilient, more cunning, and more repressive than many anticipated. The regimes expected to collapse “in the short run” are still with us; and if they happen to disintegrate, there is no reason to conclude the MIGs will be their inheritors. Militant roads to power through assassination, military coups, and insurrection had a vast record of failures in achieving their objectives.

When the MIGs found their paths to power blocked, they began to develop alternative strategies. Some sought to reach ceasefires with their regimes in order to deal with their political and organizational losses and internal divisions (e.g., the Islamic group). Others have fled their home countries and switched from the domestic level to the global level or from the national to the international domains (e.g., the Jihad group).

The attacks by the MIGs against American targets starting in 1996 reflect that shift which culminated in attacks on major symbols of American economic and military power in New York and Washington, D.C. The groups behind these attacks hoped to return to their home countries with two messages. To their masses, they had this message: “Why are you afraid of America? America is basically a paper tiger!” To the regimes in their home countries that had a high level of dependence on the U.S., they had this message: “If America could not protect its most secure military institutions from our long arm, why should you or anyone else think that it would protect you?” In short, they were asserting through a series of dramatic deeds that they really have a global reach powerful enough to strike at their enemies everywhere.
SIXTH: THE LOGIC OF CUMULATIVE PROVOCATION

The last component of the calculations of the MIGs is “the logic of cumulative provocation.” The leaders of the MIGs tell us and tell their followers that their primary objective is to shake what they deem to be the state’s basic foundation, namely its hybah or the sense of awe and invincibility it engenders among the masses. This hybah is to be undone by demonstrating the state’s failure to protect its leaders and key institutions.

In response, states are not expected to simply do nothing. Doing nothing under such conditions can amount to committing political suicide. MIGs aim to provoke the state to strike back so massively and so indiscriminately that the societal resentment of emergency laws, mass searches and mass arrests, restrictions on movement, and heavy repression could weaken the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its society and/or the credibility of its policies on the international level. They hoped this would have happened in the case of September 11. Imagine if, in response to these events, the U.S. authorities were so provoked to intern tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of Muslims living in the U.S. and the repercussions in the Muslim world when such acts were televised.

A LOOK AHEAD

I am convinced things will get tougher before they get any better regarding the threats posed by the cartel of MIGs I have discussed thus far. The signs are increasing. The attacks in the Philippines, Pakistan, and Indonesia are sort of a “propaganda by the deed.” The messages from Al Qaeda and its affiliates are clear: “We were not destroyed,” “all the asymmetry of power between the U.S. and us had not been translated into victory by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies,” “When the weak does not get obliterated, it has not lost; when the strong does not prevail, it did not win.” Add to that the chilling statement by Osama al-Zawahiri the real brain of Al Qaeda cartel warning against a looming wave of violent attacks.

The leadership of Al Qaeda must be concerned about the internal cohesion of its MIGs. When its members on the loose hear about more fellow members being arrested as a result of information derived from interrogations of captured cadres, their morale and self-confidence can only decline. Some operations with wide publicity may be perceived as morale boosters and as contributors to internal cohesion. The possibility of waves of attacks against U.S. corporate interests appears credible. Those interests are scattered everywhere all over the globe and are way less protected than American embassies or military installations. The impact of such strikes can be quite heavy because of the high interdependence in the economic sphere. Such attacks may be falsely linked to opposition by other actors to globalization as a manifestation of the “Americanization” of the world.
I would add that Al Qaeda may escalate such violent operations to coincide with two rather likely regional developments or scenarios:

- An American military campaign against Iraq with expected high human casualties among Iraqi civilians and military. This could get things heated in the “Arab and the Islamic streets.” Under this condition, calls for revenge against the U.S. could mount. By striking against U.S. targets, Al Qaeda will be saying that we, and not secular forces, are the ones who can exact revenge. It will also be saying that its organization is still effective. The fact that they do not care about the Iraqi secular regime in the slightest is beside the point. The timing will be useful. It will also show that moderate Islamist groups cannot compete for support in that context.

- Serious deterioration of the Palestinian-Israeli situation that leads to even greater confrontation between Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat, protracted Israeli occupation of the Palestinian cities, and more televised violence. That can provide another appropriate time and setting for militant action against not only Israel, but also the United States as Israel’s primary supporter.

In these cases, the MIGs are likely to claim responsibility to get credit given that they do not have a territorial base as was the case during their days in Afghanistan. The six “strategic logics” addressed here do not imply that the MIGs are necessarily prudent or that they will succeed. Their cadres are not always terribly bright as shown by the one who, after the first world trade center explosion, went back to get a $400 Ryder car deposit which led to his group’s arrest!

They failed in toppling regimes in their home countries via assassinations, military coups, and insurrections. Many of their divisions remain strong and they suffered from a tendency to engage in overextension in terms of the relationship between the desired ends and available means. At times, their “rage for God” to remake reality in their ideological image has ultimately created additional enemies, triggering more restrictions on their mobility, financial transactions, recruitment and training and also unleashing greater repression.

However, downplaying the dangers the MIGs can pose under the pretext that they represent a tiny minority of the Muslim population is no longer justified. This argument is weak and September 11 should have been enough to demonstrate that when it comes to terrorism, small can be lethal. On a much smaller scale than September 11, six terrorists killed 58 tourists in Luxor, Egypt, in 1997 and managed in the process to reduce that country’s annual growth rate by one full percentage point that year. Obviously, a small MIG can inflict huge damage if it has access to weapons of mass destruction. The events of September 11 make a strong case for the importance of understanding the key strategic beliefs of the leaders of MIGs that can give them programmatic guides for violent action.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX. A

WHAT WORKED WELL DURING OLYMPIC SECURITY OPERATIONS

1. The Utah Olympic Public Safety Command Model

- Protect the Games from undetermined risks
- Develop and implement a plan that used resources responsibly to protect the Games and the communities in Utah
- Maintain an environment consistent with the spirit of the Games and the image of the United States

Institutional Framework

The UOPSC model was created in state statute and clearly defines its membership, duties, and powers. The model worked well for a number of reasons. First the model provided a laboratory to explore a variety of command, control and coordination mechanisms. Second the command became an effective coordinating group because it included representatives from state, local and federal agencies and from the private sector. Examples of membership include:

- Law enforcement
- Fire department
- Emergency medical services
- Emergency management
- Public works
- National Guard

Conference attendees agreed that a central coordinating command that includes a variety of public and private sector agencies is a valuable element that can be applied to homeland security. Other parts of the model, such as the specific powers given are less directly applicable. The difficult challenge for homeland security will be to organize a central coordinating body that is comprehensive and inclusive, yet small enough to be effective.

2. Planning

Utah’s approach to planning the Games was based on shared experiences, ongoing research, and observing other Olympic and major events. Knowledge was transferred to us from meetings with others that have had experience in hosting events and have learned what worked well and what could have worked better.

Allow Time for Planning

Three to four years of dedicated planning is needed for an event the magnitude of the Olympics. Many Utah officials spent nearly seven years planning for the Winter Games.
Identify Event Phases

Olympic security was designed as a four-phase event. It included:

- Phase I  Planning
- Phase II  Transition from Planning to Operations
- Phase III  Operations; the Olympic Event
- Phase IV  Recovery and After Actions

Subdivide into Individual Programs The security event was further subdivided into 12 individual programs:

1. Research
2. Design
3. Master plan
4. Plan management
5. Subcommittee plans
6. Resource identification and acquisition
7. Training and testing
8. Transition
9. Operations
10. Paralympics
11. Recovery
12. After action

Organize Functional Working Groups The command authorized a planning committee that chartered functional working groups. The groups were coordinated by full-time planners and were comprised of representatives from agencies responsible for managing or supporting each function. These groups included:

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<tr>
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<th>Communications</th>
<th>Dignitary Protection</th>
<th>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</th>
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<tr>
<td>Community and Media Relations</td>
<td>Emergency Management</td>
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Allow for Plan Changes and Flexibility  A summary of the UOPSC plan was issued in the early summer of 2000. The plan was tested and refined over the next 18 months. There were constant changes during the planning and operations phases that required significant revisions in the plan. After September 11, the plan was reviewed and modified to:

- Expand aviation support activities
- Strengthen access control procedures
- Augment other aspects of the existing plan

Full-time Planners and Low Employee Turnover  Designate as early as possible those writing the plans and working in critical areas. Hire full-time planners who can be available for the duration of planning and the operation of the event. Therefore agency planners should be selected and assigned for planning and event operation. Considerable time can be lost in educating new planners on all prior issues and decisions.

In-Progress Reviews (IPRs)  Holding periodic in-progress reviews were essential when working with numerous autonomous work groups and sub-committees. The IPRs served as a valuable tool in keeping all groups focused, in synch, and communicating with each other.

3. Command, Control, and Coordination

Blend Central Coordination with Local Control  Olympic planning and operations were coordinated centrally but controlled and implemented locally.

Flexible and Effective Communications  The key to making the central coordination and local control process work effectively was a communication system that allowed information to be shared across all affected disciplines. The ability to communicate across all disciplines is a key element for homeland security.

Provide training and information about the capabilities of the equipment prior to operation. Test communication systems to confirm their operational capacity under similar event conditions. This includes, whenever possible, using the same locations, same equipment and same personnel.

4. Local Agency Involvement

Define Roles Prior to Event  State statute requiring the coordination of state and local law enforcement and public safety agencies helped build trust among participating agencies by defining the roles for each entity. Many local agencies initially were suspicious about the role the state played in coordinating Olympic planning. Including the “local culture” in planning is important in defining these roles.
Build Trusting Relationships  Clearly defining the role of state and local agencies is important in building a good working relationship. Over time, sufficient trust was built among the participating agencies to enable common interests to be identified, resources to be allocated equitably, and additional support to be provided as needed.

Agencies occasionally had a difficult time balancing their interests with the interests of the whole. Finding a working balance between central coordination and local control is important.

5. Venue Security

*I laugh when I think back to July 1999 when I was asked to be the venue commander and I wondered how this thing could be so big that it would take almost three years for me to plan. Then after being involved for a few months, I was wishing that we had more time. Start as soon as you reasonably can.* - Olympic venue commander.

Commit to Quality and Cooperation  The success of the Salt Lake Olympic venue security operations was due in large part to an extended and expansive group of individual officers, agents, National Guard troops and volunteers committed to quality. Their efforts helped realize the goal of a safe Olympic experience for spectators, staff and athletes. The cooperative effort and professionalism displayed by the National Guard most decidedly set a standard for future large events. Critical to our accomplishment were commanders who empowered their people to make decisions and determine appropriate courses of action both during the planning stages and the operational period.

Include Possible Terrorism in Plan  Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, venue commanders had been preparing their security plans with terrorism in mind. Existing plans could have secured venues, but only if they were to receive all the people and resources that commanders were requesting. After the attack, additional resources and people were made available; bringing closer what was previously requested and planned for, with that which was received.

Because of the September 11 attack, the public expected tight security. They were more accepting of any inconveniences related to security inside as well as outside the venues.

Early Coordination between State and Federal Agencies  Build strong relationships with other agencies. Establish good working relationships as far in advance as possible to build trust and confidence and to clarify roles and responsibilities.

Federal officers worked well under the command of the local venue commanders, due primarily to the coordination between the U.S. Secret Service site agents and venue
commanders prior to the Olympics. When confusion arose about who was in charge, it was usually due to personality conflicts rather than a question of command structure. Issues were handled without incident.

Use Progressive Planning and Training The training progression from classroom sessions to tabletop exercises to practical exercise proved invaluable.

Hold Frequent Meetings During Planning and Operations Working lunches and commanders’ meetings were insightful for participants. These meetings focused on asking questions, providing resources, and problem solving. Venue-related meetings were also useful and provided opportunities for team building, exchanging information, and networking for attendees. Frequent meetings helped the venue teams work together effectively during operations.

Locate Dispatch Personnel On-Site Professional dispatch personnel working on site was key to maintaining communication with all the staff assigned to the venues.

Log and Track Equipment The logistics coordinator was important in logging and tracking equipment. Equipment was requested from federal, state and local governments along with the Games organizer. After the Games are over, it is necessary to identify each piece of equipment. An organized process makes logging, tracking, and identifying equipment more efficient.

Screen Vehicles The vehicle permit system was designed to allow authorized vehicles access to different venues. A series of colors, numbers, and letters were used to represent different passes and permits indicating varying levels of authorization and access. The system was complex and required training of personnel and several adjustments before the process was understood.

Use Closed-Circuit Television Closed-circuit television for venue security is important. Heavier use is needed where there is continuous observation.

Follow Protocol After the first few unattended or suspicious items are found to be benign, there is a tendency by law enforcement and public safety personnel to abandon protocol and just look in the pack or bag. Resist this urge, follow protocol and let the experts do their jobs.

Use Civilian Volunteers Civilian volunteers assist public safety and are a valuable asset at little cost. Their contribution, regardless of their level of experience, is valuable. Educate them on the planning process and on planning decisions. Background checks on each volunteer applicant including those for law enforcement are a necessary component of the selection process.

Include Human Resources Early Personnel issues, as they do in a daily work schedule,
consume time. Bring human resource supervisors into the process early; they will be more aware and better equipped to address the issues as they are raised.

_When first given this assignment I was less than pleased, but being a good trooper most of the time, I didn’t complain too loudly. I had just come from a six-year, high-stress assignment and wanted to be able to sleep at night for a change. As the weeks wore on, many of my questions were answered, and a plan was formulated, I found myself actually getting excited. I never thought I would get excited, but I did. There were so many once-in-a lifetime experiences. For example, I watched the look on the athlete’s face when the medal was placed around his neck. I heard the roar of the crowd when the flag was raised while the Star Spangled Banner was being played. I feel much more than lucky to have been involved and to have witnessed so many great events. There is an emotional letdown when it’s over, so be prepared. It turned out to be a walk in the park for me, and I would do it again if I could._ - Olympic venue commander

6. Federal involvement

Interagency Cooperation The Olympics were the first extensive test of Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62). This directive governed how federal agencies would coordinate their security operations. Implementing PDD 62 was at times difficult, confusing, and frustrating. In the end, federal agencies were key partners with UOPSC. Lessons emerged to guide future efforts by the federal government to support major special events.

Inter-agency cooperation between the United States Secret Service and the venue community police departments proved to be invaluable. Relationships between the agencies developed early in the planning process served to circumvent potential problems and helped to reduce tension during incident resolution.

Partnerships are needed, necessary, and required. In the United States, there will be involvement from the federal government in future major events. This involvement occurs when federal dollars are provided to assist with the event. Bringing all the partners together early in the process identifies differences of direction or potential policy conflicts so they can be addressed and remedied quickly.

UOPSC developed four principles intended to influence the way a federal agency looked at supporting the Games:
1. Each federal agency should be committed to the notion that protecting the public during the 2002 Games is primarily a local responsibility.

2. Each federal agency should acknowledge that federal resources will be used to the fullest extent necessary and appropriate to ensure the safety of participants, visitors, spectators and the residents; to discharge federal statutory and regulatory responsibilities and duties in connection with the Games; and to safeguard federal lands, resources and facilities used or put at risk as a consequence of the Games.

3. Each agency should recognize that before it commits to anything it must be sure it has the authority and jurisdiction to make the commitment and to make good on the commitment. The agency and those representing it will not promise or commit resources or assets it doesn’t have or doesn’t have a reasonable expectation of acquiring for the Games. Likewise, the agency and those representing it will not promise anything that is beyond their authority or jurisdiction to provide.

4. Each federal agency should be committed to the idea that it must not unnecessarily or unreasonably duplicate what another agency or department—local, state, or federal—is doing.

To avoid potential conflicts of interest, federal planning for events like the Olympic Winter Games may need to be conducted independently of organizer, state and local law enforcement, public safety and security planning. But federal planning should be carefully coordinated to avoid unnecessary or unwise duplication and to prevent waste.

Conduct In-depth Reviews of Future Bids The federal government should conduct an in-depth review of future Olympic bids and the potential costs of a successful bid to the federal government for security, public safety, and for support for infrastructure or other needs that a city might have if awarded the event. In the absence of a review and oversight process, once a U. S. city enters the competition to host an Olympic Game, it could become very costly for the federal government and for venue communities, for organizers, and for the host state.

Conduct In-depth Reviews of Future Security Plans Aggressive reviews of law enforcement, public safety and security plans associated with bids submitted to host major events like the Olympics in the United States by the federal government is suggested. In the case of the Olympics, a review should be completed prior to a city being selected by the USOC for submission to the IOC as a candidate city to host in the future. The current evaluation for an event as a candidate for National Security Special Event (NSSE) status is done only after events are awarded or planning is underway.

Recommend a Federal Central Coordinating Office Security planning could be streamlined by the help of the federal government by centering federal agency responsibilities in connection with an event once designated National Special Security Event into one central office. The office could:

- Employ a special events coordinator that has budget authority for what is sought in support of such events for security, public safety and law enforcement, as well as other legal and appropriate event expenses.
• Control special appropriations made to the lead federal agencies and the agencies
tapped to assist the lead agencies in meeting their event-related responsibilities
• Provide access to all of the intelligence that might affect an event, as well as
consolidating planning to meet the risks associated with such events
• Eliminate any competition in the executive branch over who is responsible for what
in connection with such events
• Consolidate and coordinate planning and support for international events in which
United States participation is critical, as well as for domestic special events
• Require the involvement of departments and agencies throughout the executive
branch for acts of political violence committed against United States citizens
participating in events overseas

7. Military involvement

After September 11, 2001 the military provided assistant without hesitation. There were
two dimensions to its involvement with the 2002 Games: the National Guard and the
Department of Defense (DOD).

The National Guard and the DOD The military provided over 3,500 people to help
secure the Games. Most of these were National Guard men and women. Their impact
and support for venue security operations was positive, professional, and remarkable.

The military was responsible for or supported the:

• Venue sweep
• Perimeter posts
• Vehicle screening areas
• Operations
• All pedestrian entry points

Military personnel lived in warehouses, ate ready to eat meals (MREs), and worked long
shifts in outdoor postings or cold tents.

Military support to special events will always be premised on alternative requirements
of military assets. Additionally, military resources can always be withdrawn at the last
moment if a crisis erupts. In order to meet future major event responsibilities federal
law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI and USSS, should develop alternate plans
and train additional personnel.
8. Law Enforcement Volunteers

Not all my experiences in Utah were good... Would I come to Utah and work the Olympics all over again? Yes, in a heartbeat! I personally had to do more than give blood and money after September 11. You needed assistance, and I needed to help. It was good for both of us. -Law enforcement volunteer

Establish Policies for Law Enforcement Volunteers Over 600 police from throughout the United States volunteered to help UOPSC. Most of them traveled to Utah at their own costs and used vacation time to be released from their normal work. Volunteers were a critical part of the UOPSC success. Implementing explicit policies for event security managers regarding how volunteer police will be used within venues is important. These policies define the roles for how event security managers and volunteers can work together. Volunteer police primarily secured venues, provided other security work and guard duty.

Police volunteers significantly reduce the costs of event security and provide a pool of qualified, trained, and experienced volunteers. They are trained, and use their training daily, to recognize and react to any possible problem that could occur. Federal legislation to assure their availability, maybe necessary, if the use of police volunteers is to become the norm.


Identify Responsible Entity for Scope, Level, and Jurisdiction The UOPSC integrated all public safety disciplines. Its enabling legislation authorized fire, EMS, emergency management, and public works representatives to participate.

Fire services almost exclusively are the domain of local government. But, local law enforcement had counterparts at the state and federal levels and occasionally struggled with which level was responsible for what. The scope, jurisdiction and authorities of fire and EMS providers were clear from the start of the planning process. Identifying who is responsible for what, when a service has authority at different levels of government is important for avoiding future conflicts.

The 2002 Games marked the first time public works was incorporated into Olympic security planning anywhere in the United States. Public works provided essential community services that directly affected the daily lives of Olympic participants.

10. Accreditation

Three-Part Credentialing System Olympic-related accreditation is the access control system that is used to identify those who have Olympic related responsibilities and who
have the authority to enter a venue and or secure area. UOPSC adopted a three-part system:

- Part One Generic—a picture identification that did not grant access to venues or secure locations
- Part Two Venue Specific—issued by venue commanders and gave access to certain zones within a venue
- Part Three Weapons—issued by the Secret Service and gave permission to carry weapons at the venue

Salt Lake Olympic Committee also had a process for accreditation that several agencies used, particularly for Part Two passes. Establishing who is responsible for approving credentials such as Part Two passes is important if a formal process is adopted.

Timelines, Training, and Logistics Personnel need to be identified early to meet credentialing deadlines and trained to understand the system to be effective. Logistics and procedures should be planned early and in advance of the event.

11. Recruiting

Recruit Counterparts in Other States and Localities UOPSC recruited assistance from within the state and from other states by asking for police chiefs, sheriffs, and Utah’s public safety commissioner to contact their counterparts in other states and localities. Prior to September 11, there was a belief that there were sufficient public safety personnel within the state to staff the Olympic security mission. These efforts increased after the attack.

12. Relationships

Build Solid Personal and Working Relationships The keystone to successful security operations is in knowing and trusting the people you work with, particularly those who have policy, coordination, and operational responsibilities. Gaining confidence in others and developing trusting relationships came as a result of participating in numerous planning meetings and trainings in the years leading to the Games.

13. Training

Planners for special events are planning an operation that brings together many participants from a number of different organizations. They essentially create a new organization out of many. Such an event can involve large numbers of public safety agencies with special skills, knowledge, and abilities that need an integrated operational plan. Knowledge of this plan is important to the successful participation of any agency.
Training programs and exercises that educate personnel, test assumptions, and validate operational plans are critical.

**Divide Training into Subcategories**

The public safety-training program was divided into five areas:

- Overview of Olympic operations
- Specialty training
- Field Exercises
- Venue-specific training
- Product/equipment training

**Develop Test Exercises** Training exercises validate planning and allow time for adjustments to be made prior to an event being operational. They should be designed to test the concepts of the overall plan and involve those who will be executing the operation and using the equipment.

**Fund Training Exercises** Training should be included and funded as a separate item in the master plan and budget.

**Schedule Exercises Early in Process** An aggressive training schedule should be developed with enough time left to make any necessary changes and corrections before going operational.

Over 3,000 (of UOPSC’s 12,000) public safety officers received the basic UOPSC Olympic training. As the threat of civil disturbances at the Games increased, UOPSC initiated a mobile field-force training program. Eventually approximately 2,000 law enforcement officers and more than 700 members of the National Guard participated in the program. Approximately 7,000 federal officers traveling to Utah on temporary duty were provided an orientation to the Olympics and the UOPSC plan. Almost 60 scenario-based tabletop and field exercises were conducted.

**14. Incident Tracking**

**Gather and Disseminate Sensitive Information** UOPSC used a proprietary computer system, called “E-Team.” It was the primary means for incident reporting and distributing intelligence. The system was also used for information management, situation awareness, and resource management.

Other critical elements were also incorporated in the system. They include:

- Infrastructure for hospitals, shelters, and transportation systems
 Availability of hospital beds and medical personnel on a daily basis

 Other real-time updates on capacity for emergency medical decision makers

Having a common communications and data-sharing system during incidents is valuable. By the time the Games began, over 4,000 public safety professionals had been trained to use E-Team. More than 1,700 incident reports were created and modified. Primary incidents reported included:

 Suspicious persons and packages
 Suspicion
 Transportation-related events
 Bomb threats

### 15. Communications

The ability to communicate efficiently with different systems and equipment, organizations and agencies, and personnel is vital to assuring a successful security event.

#### Identify Components of Communications

The communications function provided:

 Radio
 Video
It was the most complicated, difficult to plan and execute of all the UOPSC functions. With no room for error as the objective, success was expected and achieved.

Identify Geographic Coverage and Groups for Communications

UOPSC provided communications to:

- Over 20 venues
- Specialized centers and their respective forward-staging areas
- Olympic Coordination Center
- FBI Joint Operations Center
- United States Secret Service Coordination Center
- Department of Defense Joint Task Force-Olympics Operation Center
- State of Utah Comprehensive Emergency Management Coordination Center
- Salt Lake Olympic Committee (SLOC) Main Operations Center

Build a Redundant System and Identify Capacity By using different radio (agency and commercial) and telecommunications systems (“not everything in one basket”) UOPSC was able to get the redundancy it needed for success.

The Utah Communications Agency Network (UCAN) was a key provider of communications resources during the Games. The system:

- Consisted of 43 remote sites connected by microwave, fiber and copper into a central control system, allowing coordination of calls throughout the coverage area of the network
- Provided coverage to nine counties and all Olympic Venues
- Connected sixteen public safety 911 dispatch centers which route traffic to the police, fire, EMS and other public safety responders

In addition, UCAN contracted with SLOC to provide an in-venue 800 megahertz (MHz) communications system for venue management functions that supported analog and digital communications. Both systems operated in the 800 MHz portion of the radio spectrum and supported 10,000 radio units for public safety and 5,600 radios in the venues for Games management.

During the 17 days of the Games:

- 8.5 million calls were processed by the UCAN system
The UCAN system continues to provide service to 93 government agencies. The SLOC portion has been dismantled and will be reused for expanding the existing network.

Coordinate Communication with Site Owners Most radio communications sites are privately owned and could receive many calls from public safety agencies that want to use the same space at the sites. UOPSC coordinated this communications effort, but public safety could also be the central point of contact.

Provide a Detailed Site Plan During the planning process providing a detailed site plan allows for a comprehensive site survey to be conducted.

Train on Equipment Comprehensive training for users on the communications systems and equipment can prevent major problems during event operations and is critical.


Incorporate Private Sector Working with UOPSC, the Private Security Working Group incorporated the interests of private firms into the Olympic operation. The group served as a conduit between public safety and the private sector.

17. Aviation

The aviation plan was a very detailed and complex airspace management and protection program. The plan was successful in that there were no aircraft accidents, injuries, or incidents.

Interagency Cooperation and Support for Requirements Coupling interagency cooperation with the willingness to support requirements within agency capabilities allowed UOPSC to accomplish its tasks with minimal resources and in the available time. During the Games, the aviation mission included:

- 1,000 people to execute the plan
- Supporting 2,455 accident-free flight hours
- Flying 735 missions/sorties
- Performing 2,399 aviation security inspections
- Authenticating 6,630 aircraft
- Intercepting 20 airspace violators and taking appropriate action

Federal Agency Involvement The federal government is the only entity capable of protecting airspace, and if the event is not declared an NSSE, then there is no mechanism
or authority for coordinated federal involvement in a complete airspace protection mission. Providing protection requires a coordinated multi-agency approach involving the Secret Service, Customs, the FAA, and DOD.

Currently, PDD 62 only authorizes and directs a coordinated federal effort for an NSSE. Therefore, procedures and directives have to be developed at the federal level to allow states and local agencies to request and receive federal support for non-NSSE events requiring airspace protection.

Involve Private Sector and New Technology Aviation support is technical and expensive. Planners find ways to provide the necessary support with the minimum expenditure of resources. Many new and evolving technologies, that are cost effective, include:

- Integrating cellular phones into the aircraft avionics systems to provide additional communications support
- Installing global positioning tracking systems into the aircraft for positive control and identification

18. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Plan

The key elements in the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) response were:
• Bomb management center
• Assessment teams at venues
• Vehicle screeners
• Canine assets
• Render safe procedure teams

A total of 140 bomb technicians were available during the Games and came from:
• State of Utah
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
• Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
• Other out of state agencies

No significant EOD-related emergency or disasters occurred during the operational period. Teams:

• Dispatched to 142 calls
• Evaluated 468 unattended items
• Involved in 19 disruption techniques

The operational plan, standard operating procedures, and memoranda of agreements drafted and signed for the Olympics should be a template for EOD operations in future Games.

19. Intelligence

The job of the Olympic Intelligence Center (OIC) was to collect, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate relevant, accurate, and timely intelligence. More than 60 federal, local, state and international agencies participated in UOPSC’s intelligence operation.

The OIC was made up of three main components:

• Counter-terrorism Intelligence Section formed by the FBI
• Critical Intelligence Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination Unit formed by the Utah Department of Public Safety and other state and local agencies
• Dignitary Protection Intelligence formed by the United States Secret Service

For forty days the UOPSC had the most comprehensive intelligence center in the world. Its intelligence plan was both comprehensive and ambitious.

Plan Early Have a plan put together at least two years before the event

Identify Key Team Personnel Organize teams to carry out the plan that consists of
personalties that can get along and people that have the authority to get things done in their own department. Empower teams with commitment from administrators and funds to carry out plans for the duration of the event.

Training on Products and Procedures Insure that all intelligence clients receive training about the products they will receive and how to use those products.

20. Traffic and In-Transit Security

Previous events have demonstrated that two things can quickly disrupt an Olympics: security incidents and traffic problems. Local communities hosting an event worry about traffic more than almost any other issue. Ensuring the smooth flow of traffic has become one of the central ingredients of a successful major special event.

With isolated exceptions, there were no significant traffic problems during the Olympic period. As one national news story put it, describing how well things were going, “We can’t even complain about the traffic.” This outcome is a direct result of planning.

Developing a complex traffic plan requires two critical skills: planning and getting things done. The planner creates the vision, develops programs, and documents what should be done and how it will all come together. The “get things done” person works on logistics, acquisitions, meets with stakeholders, and works the multitude of political issues that traffic planning generates. It is unusual to find all skills in one person. Consequently, more than one person may need to fill the traffic planning leadership position.

If looked at globally, the traffic and in-transit missions are overwhelming. The task is made more manageable by taking each venue as a separate event and working outward from the venue, identifying traffic congestion and what impact it will have on surrounding venues. It is much easier conceptually and psychologically to deal with 10,000 vehicles going to one event than to look at 200,000 vehicles moving around the Olympic theater.

The GPS locator was an amazing tool that was not used to its full potential. Future events might make use of two other existing system capabilities. The units can be equipped with a camera to send photos from inside the vehicle to the operation center. The units also can remotely shut off the vehicle’s engine. Both features can help law enforcement diagnose situations and develop responses.
The traffic/in-transit mission should probably be one of the first staffed by local law enforcement. Officers assigned to these positions have unique requirements and challenges. Other law enforcement functions and missions have more flexibility regarding the types of officers who can be used.

21. Security Costs

As of May 31, 2002 total security costs for the 2002 Games were an estimated $310 million, of which, approximately $272 million were direct federal expenditures. State and local governments spent the remaining $38 million. The state and local expenditures were incremental Olympic costs, money that would not have been spent had it not been for the Games. Of the $38 million provided by the federal government for state and local expenditures, $23 million were used by UOPSC.

22. Public Affairs

UOPSC’s Joint Information Center (JIC) was designed to ensure coordination of public information between agencies and to provide assistance to agency spokespeople.

Security preparations received very limited coverage until September 11 when the topic was pushed to the forefront. In the weeks leading up to the Games, the volume of calls requesting interviews increased dramatically. Once the Games started, they dropped off somewhat. However, there were many reporters in town waiting for an incident to occur. These members of the media were looking for anything of a security nature to report. Many became frustrated and thought UOPSC was hiding something when it didn’t have anything to share with them.

Leading up to the Games, local media asked questions about the following issues:

- Transportation
- New developments in the security planning process
- Budgets
- Number of public safety personnel
- Training
- Protests plans

After September 11 but before the Games began, local, national and international media focused on:

- How long the planning process had been going on
- Whether the Games would be cancelled
- What the security plan was, changes made to the plan
- Number of people involved
- Structure and procedures of the Olympic Command
• The Olympics as a terrorist target
• Costs
• Types of incidents expected
• Domestic terrorism
• The Games as an armed camp
• Whether athletes and visitors were nervous about coming to Utah
• Air restrictions
• Demonstrations

During the Games, media wanted to know:
• How many times airspace restrictions had been violated
• How many suspicious packages had been located
• What types of things had been confiscated at the venues
• Security breaches at venues
• Transportation and security-related delays

23. Public Health

Public health elements were not included formally within the UOPSC command structure. The public health community formed its own group - The Environmental and Public Health Alliance - to integrate state, local and federal public health efforts. This group coordinated many relevant activities with UOPSC. Coordination between public safety and public health was especially instrumental in the successful resolution of the “false anthrax” incident.

24. Crime

Compared with the same period in 2001, crime was down throughout the Olympic theater during the Games in all of sixteen categories that were tracked by UOPSC. The primary increase was in the number of business license violations that occurred in Summit County and in Salt Lake City. Business license ordinances were used to gain control of unofficial ticket and merchandise sales and re-sales that were causing congestion at Park and Ride lots and on city streets at peak traffic periods.

Other data were mixed about reported crime in the communities that hosted the 2002 Winter Games. Some jurisdictions indicated crime increased for some offense categories. In other jurisdictions, reported crime remained the same or decreased slightly. No general conclusion can be reached about the impact on crime of having a major event like the Olympics.
APPENDIX B.

WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE MORE EFFECTIVELY

1. **Planning** Most planners assigned to a major event subcommittee are assigned there as an additional duty to an already demanding workload. Identifying and justifying resource needs was quite frustrating and time consuming during most of the planning phase. It became frustrating to work on an issue with set parameters and find that most, if not all, of what had been planned for had to be discarded. It was less frustrating during operations to make changes.

2. **Equipment** logistics and tracking. Some venue commanders were still trying to locate lost equipment in the late spring of 2002.

3. **Vehicle Permits** The vehicle permit system was very confusing. There were too many colors, numbers, and letters that meant too many things. Several problems were encountered in the first few days with the vehicle-screening process due to the complexity of the passes and permits. There were several different changes and adjustments, which occurred during the first few days until everyone understood the process.

4. **Law Enforcement** The single largest problem encountered was the boredom of the officer observing the area.

5. **Military** Problems were reported regarding the Department of Defense support to the Games. Prior to September 11, there was a growing belief within the command that DOD was reluctant to support the public safety. After September 11, DOD’s hesitation vanished. The terms and conditions under which the DOD will support an event like the Olympics could be more carefully defined. To the extent it can do so before it considers a specific event, the DOD ought to clarify the process and the rules it will follow when considering and granting or refusing aid.

6. **Accreditation** As in other Olympic Games, accreditation was a major problem. Credentials were a source of anguish and conflict among agencies and personnel. Organizers tended to be worried that police and other public safety personnel would use credentials to get into venues to see events. Police were concerned that the failure to have liberal access might hamper public safety efforts to respond to incidents. Individuals often checked the accreditation privileges on their cards against co-workers to see who had the broadest access. Variable access created “access envy.” This may be an endemic feature of major events.

7. **Communication** For future Games, public safety should designate one individual to manage and coordinate all frequency issues, including radio and video. This quite possibly would have prevented the organizing committee from allowing international teams to use government band frequencies.

8. **Private security** Some participants in the private-sector security community reported that they had difficulty getting UOPSC’s attention to help with infrastructure protection concerns.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

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