



**REFORMING THE CULTURE
OF NATIONAL SECURITY:
VISION, CLARITY,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Final Report of a Working Group of the
Markle Foundation and the
Center on Law and Security at the
NYU School of Law

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MARKLE FOUNDATION

THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF A NONPARTISAN WORKING GROUP OF THE CENTER ON LAW AND SECURITY, SPONSORED BY THE MARKLE FOUNDATION. Members of the working group represented a broad spectrum of views and experiences. Our participants identified the range of present and future challenges requiring an integrated response by the range of national security agencies and departments, and offered strategies and approaches to effectively address them.

Our findings include:

1. Bureaucratic culture and lack of leadership, rather than structural issues, cause integral weakness in our national security system.
2. Stovepiping and lack of information sharing present the key vulnerability to threat assessment and response.
3. Current mechanisms for accountability are insufficient.
4. Complex and evolving threats, including but not limited to terrorism, are among the central national security issues confronting the Obama administration. Climate change, energy requirements, economic challenges, and the possibility of pandemics are all part of the threat matrix.

Our recommendations include:

1. Rather than fundamental structural changes, the panel recommends clarification of the roles and responsibilities of individual actors and agencies. Responsibility for threat assessment and response should be clearly assigned to minimize interagency competition.
2. Reform should focus on collaboration and information sharing among agencies.
3. Accountability mechanisms must be created and instituted throughout the national security system.
4. Integrated approaches for threat management and response that include officials from all pertinent agencies must be established. Clear delineation of the lines of authority and responsibility are essential to their success.

This report asserts that effective policy begins with clarity and ends with accountability, rather than repeated structural reform. Its recommendations can be implemented quickly and can provide the basis for further interagency improvements.



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REFORMING THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: VISION, CLARITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Seven years after terrorism emerged as the singular focus of national security, it is increasingly being understood as an ongoing threat that must be managed rather than an overriding organizing principle to be addressed through emergency measures. With that development comes the realization that the threat environment – and the responses required to protect the United States – has become more complex. The persistent dangers of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation, evolving energy security requirements, climate change, the possibility of pandemics, and large-scale population movements are risks that must be understood and planned for at the highest levels of government. The key to confronting these 21st century threats lies in adequately addressing the linkages among them while at the same time holding individuals and agencies accountable for achieving specific goals. This is arguably where government's greatest challenges lie – in simultaneously respecting the interconnectedness of the threat environment while ensuring that accountability and purpose are maintained throughout the process. The interdependency of threats requires improved policy coordination and, just as the threats are interdependent, the responses must be equally integrated and collaborative. Therefore, a strong and functioning interagency process is essential at all levels.

At the same time, while the ability of the United States to focus on the full spectrum of national security priorities may have been diminished by the concentration of resources in the fight against terrorism, recent approaches to confronting terrorism have led to valuable lessons about interagency coordination and the importance of creating a need-to-share information environment to supplant the conventional and currently dominant “need to know” culture and the concomitant danger of stovepiping information within and among agencies.

In this spirit of applying lessons learned, the Markle Foundation sponsored a Center on Law and Security project on the changing landscape of national security. The Center hosted a series of non-partisan discussions among members of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, as well as representatives from the private sector, universities, and the NGO community [See Appendix A]. Participants identified the range of present and over-the-horizon threats requiring the integrated response of multiple agencies and departments and offered strategies and approaches to effectively address them. Importantly, most working group participants did not recommend a dramatic restructuring of the existing national security architecture. Rather, they endorsed a transformation in culture from one that encourages and rewards isolation (“silozation”) and stovepiping to one that encourages and rewards integration in information sharing and interagency collaboration.¹

¹ The Project on National Security Reform released the timely and important report “Forging a New Shield” in November 2008. The report called for, among many important recommendations, the restructuring and overhaul of the national security structure created by the National Security Act of 1947. We do not disagree with the conclusions of that report and view them as essential long-term priorities. The Markle Foundation and the Center on Law and Security approached similar questions, but looked particularly at solutions that can be executed in the short and medium terms as well as the balance between the need for greater interagency collaboration and the importance of expertise and specialization.

The overarching questions asked of the working group were:

1. Does the changing landscape of national security demand a change to the current national security structure as outlined in the 1947 National Security Act? If so, what is the scope of the changes required?
2. What kinds of changes are needed? Are they structural or cultural – or both?
3. What specific reforms, if any, might be accomplished in a short-term time frame as a prelude to a longer-term overhaul?

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Weaknesses in the national security apparatus, including stovepiping, inefficient communication, deleterious competition, and overlapping lines of authority, are problems of culture rather than bureaucracies. *To facilitate coordination, lines of authority and responsibility need to be clarified, perhaps by the national security adviser. The goal is to assign responsibility for assessing and responding to specific potential threats within and among the different agencies and departments. This would resolve the cultural vulnerability that cross-agency work can bring about. Clarification of mission and authority would make the interagency process stronger by minimizing competition.*

II. Stovepiping and poor information sharing together constitute a key vulnerability in the current system of threat assessment and response. *The focus of reform should be on collaboration and information sharing rather than on restructuring existing institutions and departments or creating new structures. It is important, however, to ensure that reform efforts do not simply replace the problems of poor or non-existent interagency processes with excessive interagency processes that dilute both accountability and expertise.*

III. Mechanisms of accountability are insufficient; their absence weakens the efficiency and reliability of threat analysis and assessment. *Mechanisms of accountability must be devised for all stages of the process of collecting, analyzing, and responding to threat-related information. Initial statements of purpose (along the lines of the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review), combined with the assignment of specific tasks and goals, performance reports, and oversight reviews by Congress, would comprise the basic building blocks of an accountability mechanism. These quantitative and qualitative measures would augment the delineation of authority described in Section I above.*

IV. Cross-cutting threats are the central national security challenge for the Obama administration. *Multi-track, integrated approaches that address day-to-day management of the threat matrix should be created. These processes must include representatives from the spectrum of related fields. Coupled with clear lines of authority and responsibility, these processes should be geared towards information sharing and collaboration. At the same time, the integrated approach must not replace the role of expertise.*

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Weaknesses in the national security apparatus, including stovepiping, inefficient communication, deleterious competition, and overlapping lines of authority, are problems of culture rather than bureaucracies.

Refashioning and reorganizing government is often proposed as a solution to institutional breakdowns in the national security process. Structural fixes, however, do not address the underlying and essential issues that arise when expertise and specialization are seen as elements of differentiation and divisiveness rather than as potentially unifying factors. Nor can structural remedies provide an atmosphere that is conducive to interagency trust, collaboration, and a unified sense of mission.

Many of the problems found in the national security apparatus may be understood as requiring more than structural solutions such as reorganizing lines of authority, consolidating functions, and creating or eliminating agencies. Improvement will necessitate leadership, strong accountability measures, and organizational changes. While structural changes can have an effect on some problems, the specific obstacles of stovepiping, communication, deleterious competition, and overlapping lines of authority are recurring in nature and often endure despite structural fixes. Moreover, structural changes are costly in both time and political capital.

The solution, entailing this combination of reforms, will require both the recruitment and retention of experienced managers vested with authority commensurate to their roles and the creation of an environment conducive to information sharing. This must then be coupled with clearly delineated lines of responsibility. Useful interagency coordination can only take place when these factors are present and actively encouraged. It is essential, however, not to allow the interagency process, which inevitably blurs the lines of specialization, to obfuscate mechanisms of accountability.

Prior attempts to reduce stovepiping have focused on structural remedies such as reorganizing, combining or deconstructing specific agencies. In fact, stovepiping results from predominantly cultural factors: competition for positioning vis-à-vis higher officials and the conventional notion that secrecy protects national security. Consensus among the working group held that the leading factor in the breakdown of smooth and reliable information flows resulted predominantly from conflicting cultures (as opposed to solely legal or technical barriers).

Different agencies and departments have different missions and priorities in terms of problem analysis and response. For example, there is a history of contention and distrust between the public health and security sectors. Public health officials want to ensure that people can come forward and seek services without feeling intimidated. This can lead to reluctance to share information with law enforcement officials out of fear that doing so would chill cooperation from the public.

Nor do these tensions occur solely between agencies, they can also be internecine. The vesting of broad responsibilities in a single agency, such as the Department of Homeland Security, can result in competing cultures even internally. Border issues and disaster response, for example, involve entirely different sets of players, making communication difficult.

In addition, competition among governmental departments, especially between the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD), can lead to excessive divisiveness. Over the course of the recent decade, a number of traditional State Department competences have been shifted to the DOD, weakening DOS in the process. There has been an erosion of State Department programs and personnel, as several functions have been diverted to other agencies and departments, especially to the Department of Defense in the areas of public diplomacy and the former functions of the U.S. Information Agency, civil society building in pre- and post-conflict stabilization efforts including security assistance, and foreign disaster assistance and humanitarian USAID programs. Such a shift becomes increasingly difficult to reverse. As more resources are allocated to the Defense Department, for example, its capacity increases and it becomes the instinctive go-to agency when problems arise, regardless of whether its portfolio is actually the best match. This leads to further funding allocations at the expense of other departments. As the Project on National Security Reform notes, “The absence of an effective integration mechanism for soft (civilian) power stimulates unhealthy reliance on hard (military) power, including inadequate resourcing for soft-power capabilities.”²

There is a strong need for a study of what exactly has happened in terms of the size, mission, and budget of the State Department, as well as a reconsideration of the role of the State Department going forward. Any such study should keep in mind the role of Congress and its constituencies in organizing and funding military as well as non-military tools.

In considering the division of labor between DOS and DOD, the issue of Pakistan is instructive. There are currently two objectives designed to address instability in Pakistan: strengthening and expanding Pakistani government control in western Pakistan, and halting the flow of militants across the border. DOS could be charged with managing the first task while DOD could be charged with managing the latter. Meanwhile, even within DOD some components could be focused on training and equipping Pakistani forces, with others focused on kinetic military operations around the border. There could be tradeoffs and tensions between these various missions, even with broad agreement on strategy. The overall goal would be a clear assignment of responsibility between the departments, clear lines of accountability and reporting structures, and a unified plan for achieving stability.

In another example, that of the foreign visitor programs, there might be government-wide agreement that we should expand educational exchanges with some key Muslim countries while also improving security screening processes with regard to those programs. The Department of State might, for example, focus on facilitating the exchanges while the Department of Homeland Security manages the necessary screening programs.

²Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield* (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency and Project on National Security Reform, 2008), 591.

Recommendation: To facilitate coordination, lines of authority and responsibility need to be clarified, perhaps by the national security adviser. The goal is to assign responsibility for assessing and responding to specific potential threats within and among the different agencies and departments. This would resolve the cultural vulnerability that cross-agency work can bring about. Clarification of mission and authority would make the interagency process stronger by minimizing competition.

Rather than wholesale structural change, the panel recommends reforms in appointments and responsibilities. This can be accomplished by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of individual actors and agencies. One primary weakness of the current government mechanisms for national security is an abundance of unclear portfolios combined with an absence of necessary positions. Improved clarity in lines of authority and responsibility would directly address the problem of divisive cultural tensions by assuring individuals that their efforts will not be superseded by others and that performance reviews will be conducted.

Reorganization of responsibilities and priorities is often an unattractive option for incoming administrations due to the opportunity costs required. Reorganizing requires an expenditure of valuable political capital to a greater extent than does policymaking. Consequently, changes in policy, which do not bear the same high costs, take precedence over more important reforms.

To date, rather than clarity there has been an excess of overlap throughout the national security network. This stems from a failure to delineate distinct – although complementary – roles for individual departments, leading to confusion and duplication of effort instead of effective integration. Such overlap exists, for example, between the DNI, CIA, DIA, and DHS, and between DOS and DOD (in matters of public diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and other non-military activities). Overlapping authorities bear the prospect of diluting accountability. This ambiguity was evident when the group could not reach a consensus on whether DHS, FBI or DOD should take the lead on matters of combating terrorism.

In addition to clear lines of authority and clear goals for which agencies and individuals should be held accountable, there needs to be agreement on the lead agency for each U.S. governmental response to identifiable threat areas. On the broader national security challenge, there needs to be a point person and/or department that can take the lead in cross-agency issues. This lead will enhance the cultural change that this report sees as the main solution to the problems of the current national security framework. Perhaps no single agency should be the lead on broad national security issues that involve every aspect of national power, any more than we should have looked to any one agency to take the lead on waging the Cold War. However, individual agencies can have coordinating responsibility for specific challenges, as in the case of DHS and Hurricane Katrina.

Moreover, overlap, especially without proper lines of accountability, tends to confuse and ignore questions of authority. The NCTC has been charged with overseeing the synchronization of the various counterterrorism efforts but has not been given sufficient authority to do so. Without an

established outline of authority and accountability, efforts to coordinate information sharing and collaboration may be sidelined or even blatantly ignored.

After a lead agency has been appointed for a given task, there must be long-term coordination to ensure that the separate plans developed and implemented by the respective participants properly reinforce each other. The people responsible for overseeing tasks across multiple agencies must have the actual authority to provide for coordinated action and a shared sense of purpose among them. Otherwise, valuable time and manpower will be squandered while different agencies pursue their particular priorities. Metrics for accomplishing interagency goals must be developed.

The division of labor among agencies must be clarified well beyond its current state. Clarification will entail assigning specific goals and accomplishments and specific lines of authority and accountability to specific positions and to agencies. The reliance on informal means of assigning responsibilities should cede to a codified outline of positions and expectations of those who hold those positions.

Because management is always second to policy, policymakers tend to focus their time in office on content, but at this point the environment is sufficiently dysfunctional to warrant a staffing plan at the outset of the Obama administration that offers clarity of definition for authority and responsibility for every post, both old and new.

Along these lines, it is necessary for the Obama administration to carefully assess and prioritize the range of security threats and to decide which threats warrant a position inside the White House in order to best ensure the safety of the nation and which might be constructively combined at different stages of the process. Thus, interviewees supported the current thinking of national security experts that energy and climate change ought to be combined within a single governmental agency while the response to nuclear terrorism can be met through a White House coordinator, which the Obama administration has moved quickly on.

Participants unanimously agreed that the system is only as good as the people in it. No amount of structural perfection, information sharing or collaborative effort can make up for a lack of experience, knowledge or management ability.³ Carefully selected, dedicated, and experienced people, endowed with sufficient authority, can transcend the cultural boundaries that have arisen within and between these agencies. In the recent past, problems of cultural distance have been solved by the ad hoc efforts of individuals determined to effect interagency dialogue. These attempts, led by individuals – e.g., the coordinator for homeland security at the White House or the special envoy for the Bosnia peace talks – have informally encouraged good working relationships among parties normally isolated from one another and have led to more successful collaboration and information sharing.

³ The development of management-level training programs for national security positions is a priority meriting immediate attention. Adequate training specific to national security and commensurate to the need is not currently available in a university setting.

II. Stovepiping and poor information sharing together constitute a key vulnerability in the current system of threat assessment and response.

The breakdown in the interagency process creates a fundamental problem in information sharing and negatively affects security and preparedness. Though the Bush administration was able to smooth some interdepartmental friction in counterterrorism through agreements and open discussions among and between agencies, stovepiping continues to plague constituent parts of the interagency process when facing the broader range of cross-cutting national security challenges. In the case of climate change, for example, the issue has in the past been divided between the Departments of Energy, State, and Treasury, among others, with no overarching point of contact for discussion of overall methods, goals, and information.

Additionally, the rapid expansion of document and information classification in recent years has reduced information sharing within and among agencies. As producers increasingly classify information, the consumers of the information have a diminished picture of the threat they are tasked with assessing. In the case of terrorism, classification of methods as well as materials has led to a dearth of information and a cloak of secrecy. For example, local law enforcement agencies, where much of the day-to-day prevention of terrorism is carried out, have expressed dismay over the lack of information made available to them by the federal government about potential threats.

Recommendation: The focus of reform should be on collaboration and information sharing rather than on restructuring existing institutions and departments or creating new structures. At the same time, mechanisms to improve interagency coordination cannot dilute individual accountability, including clearly defined metrics. Remedies must ensure that expertise and agency and department accountability remain strong. The discrete agencies must know their missions and bear responsibility for specific outcomes as well as for coordination efforts. It is important, however, to ensure that reform efforts do not simply replace the problems of poor or non-existent interagency processes with excessive interagency processes that dilute both accountability and expertise. What is needed is a new sociology rather than a new bureaucracy – a sociology that values integration and collaboration while respecting the work that must be accomplished by independent units of expertise.

Participants were decidedly opposed to major structural reform as recommended in multiple recent reports on national security reform [See Appendix B]. The group agreed that the 1947 National Security Act system and its progeny are in need of further reform but did not recommend a wholesale rethinking or architectural reorientation.

In addition to the judgment that a wholesale restructuring is unnecessary, it is also impractical at this point in time, given the fact that the Obama administration must carefully prioritize its endeavors in the face of two wars and a global economic meltdown. While bearing budgetary constraints in mind, there needs to be a focused, relatively rapid improvement of the interagency information-sharing process. A radical restructuring of the entire apparatus would cost unnecessary time, political capital, and energy at a moment when an immediate crisis in several threat

areas is possible. Moreover, the creation of new bureaucratic “boxes” likely will not remedy the cultural problems outlined above. Even in regard to the Department of Homeland Security, where the combination of varying and sometimes incompatible missions is overwhelming, there remains the view that tampering with the existing structure would be disruptive, would come at a high political and financial cost, and would not necessarily deliver the desired benefits.

Cross-cutting expertise must be applied to cross-cutting challenges. Agendas need to be creatively brought together in regular discussion. At the same time, communities of expertise need to be fostered across agency lines. The various non-threat focused parts of government need to be brought into terrorism discussions. Regional experts, terrorism experts, and representation from diplomatic, aid, and development communities unquestionably strengthen the value of such conversations. Knowledge from regional, functional, and threat experts needs to be regularly woven together to enable informed decision-making. That process cannot take place without information sharing, a curtailment of over-classification, and the elimination of harmful stovepiping. While the Obama administration has named special envoys and representatives to address urgent conflicts, in order to implement a culture that breeds interagency assignments as a matter of course it might be viable to empower assistant secretaries of state with regional responsibilities to monitor long term, less urgent foreign policy developments.

The working group concluded that a change from the culture of stovepiping must come from the White House. This could come either in the form of individuals assigned to specific threat areas or one person who would have the function of coordinating the assessments and analyses of separate threat czars. The working group tended to favor the latter, keeping in mind that not all potential threats would have a representative in the White House but that the most pertinent ones – nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and energy – might be represented.

The working group noted that continuing vigilant attention must be paid to managing the cultural problems enumerated throughout this report, which have the potential to persist and reappear (and would, in the estimation of this committee, even with structural remedies). Oversight, accountability mechanisms, and an awareness of the interagency rifts are not likely to disappear as dominant concerns in a national security structure going forward.

III. Mechanisms of accountability are insufficient; their absence weakens the efficiency and reliability of threat analysis and assessment.

The panel agreed that existing mechanisms of accountability are insufficient for meeting present national security challenges. A shared sense of mission must not cloud measures of accountability for specific agencies and departments. Notably, no one person has been designated as accountable or responsible for oversight of the country’s chief threat priority during the Bush administration – the war on terrorism. Further, those in charge of separate areas need to have responsibilities that are more closely tied to measurable results than is currently the case, as described by our panel of experts. Recently, it appears from our interviews, a culture has been

created in which success is defined by the ability to assign tasks rather than accountability for the accomplishment of the tasks themselves. All too often, status reports serve as substitutes for reports on achievements and accomplishments. Without such pointed responsibility, it is hard to ensure accountability. The goal is to go beyond strategic and philosophical objectives – such as reducing the threat of Islamic terrorism – to specific measures of progress and efficacy. Without clear job definitions, such accountability falls by the wayside, as agencies can deflect responsibility to their counterparts.

Recommendation: Mechanisms of accountability must be devised for all stages of the process of collecting, analyzing, and responding to threat-related information. Initial statements of purpose (along the lines of the DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review), combined with the assignment of specific tasks and accomplishments, performance reports, and oversight reviews by Congress, would comprise the basic building blocks of an accountability mechanism. These quantitative and qualitative measures would augment the delineation of authority described in Section I above.

Accountability is necessary to ensure collaboration between agencies and actors. This cannot be overemphasized. After clear roles and responsibilities have been established, there must be repercussions for failures to act in accordance with them, including in regard to information sharing and collaborative processes. Establishing a clear system of incentives and repercussions would alleviate major problems in the national security apparatus without necessitating major structural changes.

IV. Cross-cutting threats are the central national security challenge for the Obama administration.

At the outset, participants reached broad consensus that threats to our national security are, by nature, multidimensional. National security challenges rarely fall within the ambit of a single profession, such as intelligence or law enforcement, or even within a single agency or department, such as the Department of Defense or the Department of Homeland Security. Rather, protecting national security requires an interagency process – it is neither department-specific nor specialization-specific. Because all areas of national security are interdependent, reform efforts need to be done with the cross-cutting nature of the threat in mind. Moreover, the threat matrix – including terrorism, energy, climate change, and pandemics – is not just interagency but also interdisciplinary.

Climate, cyberthreats, and public/private relations are three major policy areas that will require a new cross-agency and cross-specialty approach for cultural change. In the matter of climate change, for example, the additional threat potential due to multi-dimensionality becomes clear. Climate change poses a security issue in terms of migration, water, and disease, as well as both an economic issue and an environmental issue. It implicates domestic economic and environmental policy but also foreign affairs and bilateral relationships with other powers such as China. Addressing only one aspect of climate change or attempting to address climate change through

only one discipline or agency is therefore unproductive. Relying on a single climate change expert whose expertise in fact lies only in domestic environmental concerns, for example, without knowledge of international ramifications or technological considerations is doomed to failure.

Recommendation: Multi-track, integrated approaches that address day-to-day management of the threat matrix should be created. These processes must include representatives from the spectrum of related fields. Coupled with clear lines of authority and responsibility, these processes should be geared towards information sharing and collaboration.

With climate change, as with other multi-dimensional areas, international relationships are essential for successfully addressing the security concerns confronting the nation. In this regard, the working group focused particularly on China and the significance of U.S.-China relations. Absent a collaborative effort, whatever reductions in carbon emissions that the United States implements will be offset by increases in emissions from China due to increased car ownership and new power-generation requirements there. Meanwhile, a significant amount of China's pollution is created in the production of goods bound for the U.S. Efforts to tax these goods in proportion to their carbon footprint, and thereby discourage polluting practices, would ultimately harm U.S. interests and is therefore an unlikely solution. Finally, in prioritizing U.S. discussions with China, climate change must compete with other areas of concern, including North Korea, Darfur, and the state of the global economy.

In order to address this issue, the new administration must facilitate discussion by persuading the Chinese government that cooperation on climate change would further its own interests. Climate change must be handled at a senior level, and it must be clear to all involved that the U.S. is intent on dealing with these issues. One way to send this signal would be to appoint an ambassador to China with an environmental background.

Cyber security is another issue that requires Chinese involvement. There is international agreement that the presence of cyber espionage in both the government and the private realms is immediate and severe. This poses a threat to our military and economic security. It might be possible to reduce our vulnerability by increasing our control over technology production, but that would be difficult, and perhaps infeasible, due to our economic reliance on China and the fact that a great deal of technological production is completed there. Instead, international cooperation is necessary.

While relations with China are an important example of the international aspects of our security apparatus, this problem is not so limited. National security concerns such as climate change and the state of the economy, as well as intellectual competition and nuclear proliferation, are necessarily global and implicate international relationships.

Public/private relations and the need for regulation and oversight for outsourcing and coordination are also related to cyber security but are prevalent elsewhere in the threat matrix as well.

The demands of the new national security state have necessitated a large amount of outsourcing to private agencies.

Considerable attention will need to be paid to public/private partnerships in building the new culture of national security. The working group addressed two pieces of this relational structure. First, potential vulnerabilities are introduced when intelligence information is generated by private entities. Those companies hold knowledge that is valuable both to the U.S. government and to other countries. Second, the inadequacy of existing mechanisms in the cyberworld run the risk of compromising institutional knowledge, both public and private. As a result, the Obama administration needs to quickly establish a system of guidelines for using these private providers. The potential for hackers to penetrate security shields in the public and private sector can, for example, have serious repercussions on information sources that are deemed the rightful intellectual property of the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

The National Security Act of 1947 established the Cold War national security bureaucracy – and it has served the nation well. And although the security challenges of the 21st century are different, this group has concluded that there is enough flexibility in the 1947 architecture for the new challenges to be met in the short term. More comprehensive reform of the 1947 National Security Act system is recommended as a long-term goal to be addressed with the time and thoroughness required, but as the federal bureaucracy grows it is important to underscore that there is no substitute for leadership that understands the importance of culture and the need for balance between interagency coordination and substantive expertise.

Cultural, as well as bureaucratic, changes can and should begin immediately. The recommendations of this report are easily implemented yet lasting solutions in the areas of information sharing, accountability measures and requirements, and the distribution of specific tasks to the separate agencies of government. For example, in-depth studies of the public/private sector relationship, the shifting relationship between the Department of State and the Department of Defense, and the necessity of international cooperation would have to be integrated into security strategies. For any national security mission, the full panoply of agencies, factors, and priorities would need to be included in the goals and benchmarks for progress.

Central to our recommendations is the strong belief that effective policy begins with clarity and ends with accountability. It is essential to define the problem, assign responsibility, empower the appropriate office with resources and decision-making authority, and hold them accountable for results. These are sound management principles common to all effective functioning in the private and public sectors.

We are confronted with new challenges that transcend traditional bureaucratic boundaries, such as the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and the intersection of energy policy,

foreign policy, and economic policy to address climate change. This panel believes there is value in creating ad hoc groups to focus on high-priority issues. In this regard, an executive-level inter-agency task force or a special envoy can help bring together different agencies to develop a coherent interagency strategy, deliver resources in an expedited manner, and bring higher-level political focus to the issue.

The creative integration of talent, knowledge, and shared policy visions should be a first-priority national security goal going forward. Over time, reform in culture rather than structure will replace the culture of isolation and reluctance to share information that can and has impeded the reliable assessment of threats and effective responses. The measures suggested above, relying upon judgment, interpretation, and approach – as well as expertise – seem to this panel to offer a realistic, timely, and far-reaching resolution to the many challenges identified and discussed by the Markle/CLS working group.

Appendix A

WORKING GROUP PARTICIPANTS

ZOË BAIRD is President of the Markle Foundation. Ms. Baird’s career spans business, government, and academia. She has been senior vice president and general counsel of Aetna, Inc., a senior visiting scholar at Yale Law School, counselor and staff executive at General Electric, and a partner in the law firm of O’Melveny & Myers. She was associate general counsel to President Jimmy Carter and an attorney in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice. She served on President Clinton’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1993 - 2001 and on the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General. Ms. Baird served on the Technology & Privacy Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense in 2003-2004 and Co-Chairs with Jim Barksdale the Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. She participates in the Steering Committee of Markle’s Connecting for Health initiative, and is on a number of non-profit and corporate boards, including the Chubb Corporation, Boston Properties, and the Brookings Institution.

PETER BROOKES is a Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, where he develops and communicates the Heritage Foundation's stance on foreign policy and national security affairs through media appearances, research, published articles, congressional testimony, and speaking engagements. He is also in his second term as a congressionally appointed member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. In addition, he served on the advisory committee of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. Prior to working at the Heritage Foundation, Brookes served in the George W. Bush administration as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he was responsible for U.S. defense policy for 38 countries and five bilateral defense alliances. Prior to the Bush administration, he worked as a Professional Staff Member with the House Committee on International

Relations. He also served with the CIA, the State Department at the United Nations, and in the private sector defense and intelligence industry. He is a decorated military veteran. Now a retired reserve Commander, during his reserve career he served with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Vice President, working as an intelligence analyst, strategic debriefer, Russian language interpreter, defense attaché, policy adviser, and Associate Professor at the Joint Military Intelligence College. He has served in political positions at the local, state and national level, including being a drafter of the Republican National Committee's 2000 foreign policy platform at the Philadelphia convention. Brookes served as an adviser to the 2000 and 2004 Bush campaigns on foreign policy.

CAROL M. BROWNER was selected by President Barack Obama to head the newly created White House Office of Energy and Climate Change. She also serves as the Assistant to the President for energy and climate change. She previously served in President Clinton's cabinet as the Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency. Leading the EPA from 1993 to 2001, Ms. Browner was the longest serving administrator in the agency's history. In that position, she developed partnerships with business, community, non-governmental, and state and local government leaders. She set tough air and water pollution standards while championing common-sense, cost-effective mechanisms for meeting environmental requirements. After leaving the EPA, Ms. Browner co-founded with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and others The Albright Group, a global strategy advisory firm, and Albright Capital Management, an investment advisory firm focused on emerging markets. She served on non-profit boards including as Chair of the National Audubon, one of the country's oldest environmental organizations, and as a member of the League of Conservation Voters, Center for American Progress, and Alliance for Climate Protection. Ms. Browner has won numerous awards, including the "Mother of the Year Award" from the National Mother's Day Committee, the South Florida Chapter of the Audubon Society's "Guy M. Bradley Lifetime Achievement Award," *Glamour* magazine's "Woman of the Year Award," and the "Lifetime Environmental Achievement Award" from the New York State Bar Association. She earned her B.A. and J.D. from the University of Florida. She has one son and is married to former New York Congressman Tom Downey.

RICHARD A. CLARKE is a Partner at Good Harbor Consulting, where he advises clients on a range of issues, including corporate security risk management, information security technology, dealing with the federal government on security and IT issues, and counterterrorism. He is an internationally-recognized expert on security, including homeland security, national security, cyber security, and counterterrorism. He is currently an on-air consultant for *ABC News* and teaches at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Clarke served the last three Presidents as a senior White House Advisor. Over the course of an unprecedented 11 consecutive years of White House service, he held the titles of Special Assistant to the President for Global Affairs, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, and Special Advisor to the President for Cyber Security. Prior to his White House years, Mr. Clarke served for 19 years in the Pentagon, the Intelligence Community, and State Department. During the Reagan Administration, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence. During the Bush (41) Administration, he

was Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs and coordinated diplomatic efforts to support the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the subsequent security arrangements.

KAREN J. GREENBERG is the Executive Director of the Center on Law and Security. She is the author of *The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo's First 100 Days* (Oxford University Press, 2009), co-editor with Joshua Dratel of *The Enemy Combatant Papers: American Justice, the Courts, and the War on Terror* (Cambridge University Press, 2008) and *The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), editor of the books *The Torture Debate in America* (Cambridge University Press, 2006) and *Al Qaeda Now* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), and editor of the *NYU Review of Law and Security*. She is a frequent writer, commentator, and lecturer on terrorism, the U.S. courts and the war on terror, global counterterrorism, and detainee issues. Her work has been featured in *The Los Angeles Times*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, *The Nation*, *The American Prospect*, and on major news channels.

MARGARET HAMBURG previously served as the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) Vice President for the Biological Program and now provides strategic advice and expertise to NTI as Senior Scientist. Before coming to NTI, Dr. Hamburg was Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. She is a physician and expert in public health and bioterrorism. Dr. Hamburg was the Commissioner of Health for the City of New York and former Assistant Director of the Institute of Allergy & Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health. She is a member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies of Science and the Council on Foreign Relations, a former member of the Aspen Strategy Group and the Intelligence Science Board, and is a fellow for the American Association of the Advancement of Science. She also serves on the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation.

STEPHEN HOLMES is a Faculty Co-Director at the Center on Law and Security and the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law at NYU School of Law. His fields of specialization include the history of liberalism, the disappointments of democratization after communism, and the difficulty of combating terrorism within the limits of liberal constitutionalism. In 2003, he was selected as a Carnegie Scholar. From 1997 to 2000, he was a professor of politics at Princeton. From 1985 to 1997, he was professor of politics and law at the Law School and Political Science Department of the University of Chicago. From 1979 to 1985, he taught at the Department of Government at Harvard University. He was also the editor-in-chief of the *East European Constitutional Review* from 1993-2003. He is the author of *Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism* (Yale University Press, 1984), *The Anatomy of Antiliberalism* (Harvard University Press, 1993), *Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy* (University of Chicago Press, 1995), and co-author (with Cass Sunstein) of *The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes* (Norton, 1999), and most recently, *The Matador's Cape: America's Reckless Response to Terror* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

ELAINE KAMARCK is a Lecturer in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, which she joined in 1997 after a career in politics and government. In the 1980s, she was one of the founders of the New Democrat movement that helped elect Bill Clinton president. She served in the White House from 1993 to 1997, where she created and managed the Clinton Administration's National Performance Review, also known as reinventing government. At the Kennedy School she served as Director of Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century and as Faculty Advisor to the Innovations in American Government Awards Program. In 2000, she took a leave of absence to work as Senior Policy Advisor to the Gore campaign. She conducts research on 21st century government, the role of the Internet in political campaigns, homeland defense, intelligence reorganization, and governmental reform and innovation. Kamarck received her PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Kamarck is the author of "The End of Government As We Know It: Policy Implementation in the 21st Century" published by Lynne Rienner Publishing, Fall, 2006.

CHRISTOPHER A. KOJM has been a Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University since June 2007. Throughout 2006, he served as a Senior Adviser to the Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by former Secretary James A. Baker III and former Rep. Lee H. Hamilton. During 2004-05 and again in spring 2006, he was the John A. Weinberg Goldman Sachs Visiting Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs in Princeton, NJ. In 2003-2004, he served as Deputy Director of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), and from September 2004 to December 2005 he was President of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, a non-profit dedicated to public education about the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. From 1998 to 2003, he held the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in the Department of State. From 1984 to 1998, he served on the Staff of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, under Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, Ranking Member (1995-1998), Chair (1993-94) and Chair of the Europe & Middle East Subcommittee (1984-1992). He also served on the associate staff of the Joint Congressional Investigation of the Iran-Contra affair (1987). From 1979 to 1984, he was a Senior Editor with the Foreign Policy Association in New York City. He holds a Master's Degree in Public Affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University (1979) and an AB in History from Harvard College (1977).

PAUL B. KURTZ is a Partner at Good Harbor Consulting. He is a recognized cyber security and homeland security expert. He has served in senior positions on the White House's National Security and Homeland Security Councils under Presidents Clinton and Bush and is currently an on-air consultant to CBS News. Prior to joining Good Harbor, he served as the founding Executive Director of the Cyber Security Industry Alliance (CSIA), an advocacy group dedicated to ensuring the privacy, reliability and integrity of information systems through public policy, technology, education and awareness. Prior to joining CSIA, Mr. Kurtz most recently was special assistant to the President and senior director for critical infrastructure protection on the White House's Homeland Security Council (HSC), where he was responsible for both physical and cyber security. Before joining HSC in 2003, Mr. Kurtz served on the White House's National

Security Council (NSC) as senior director for national security of the Office of Cyberspace Security and a member of the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, where he developed the international component of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. Previously, he was a director for counterterrorism in the NSC's Office of Transnational Threats from 1999–2001. Prior to his White House work, Mr. Kurtz served in several bureaus in the State Department, specializing in weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation policy and strategic arms control. He also served as political advisor to Operation Provide Comfort in Incirlik, Turkey, and as science attaché in Vienna, Austria. He participated in several arms control inspection teams, traveling to Iraq and North Korea.

MICHELE L. MALVESTI, a senior national security professional specializing in counterterrorism and homeland security, currently serves as Vice President for Special Programs in the Intelligence, Security, and Technology Group at Science Applications International Corporation. She also is a Senior Fellow with the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Previously, Dr. Malvesti served for more than five years on the National Security Council staff, most recently as the Senior Director for Combating Terrorism Strategy. In this role, she advised the President's National Security Advisor and Homeland Security Advisor on policy and strategy in the War on Terror and was responsible for crafting the 2007 *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and the 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. She also directed the development of *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*. Dr. Malvesti previously served from August 2002 to February 2005 as a Director and Associate Director for Regional Strategy, also in the NSC's Directorate for Combating Terrorism. Dr. Malvesti joined the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1994, first working as a program manager in the Office for Special Technical Operations. In 1996, she moved to the agency's Office of Counterterrorism Analysis where she specialized in Middle East terrorism and ultimately was awarded the Defense Intelligence Director's Award for exceptionally meritorious service in counterterrorism analysis. Prior to her work at DIA, she served as an intelligence analyst for the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. is University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and from 1995 to 2004 was dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. Prior to assuming the deanship he served as U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, in which position he won two Distinguished Service medals, and was chair of the National Intelligence Council. Dr. Nye originally joined the Harvard faculty in 1964, serving as director of the Center for International Affairs and associate dean of arts and sciences. In a 2008 poll of international relations scholars, he was rated the sixth most influential scholar in the field over the past 20 years and the most influential on American foreign policy. From 1977 to 1979, Dr. Nye was deputy to the undersecretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nye's most recent books are *The Paradox of American Power* (2002), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004), *The Power Game: A Washington Novel* (2004), and *The Powers to Lead* (2008). Nye received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University. He did post-graduate work at Oxford University on a Rhodes scholarship and earned a Ph.D. in political

science from Harvard. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and an honorary member of The British Academy. Dr. Nye is North American chairman of the Trilateral Commission.

DENNIS ROSS is currently Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for The Gulf and Southwest Asia. He was formerly a consultant to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, formerly the Washington Institute's counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow. For more than twelve years, Ambassador Ross played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process and dealing directly with the parties in negotiations. A highly skilled diplomat, Ambassador Ross was U.S. point man on the peace process in both the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. He was instrumental in assisting Israelis and Palestinians to reach the 1995 Interim Agreement; he also successfully brokered the 1997 Hebron Accord, facilitated the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, and intensively worked to bring Israel and Syria together. A scholar and diplomat with more than two decades of experience in Soviet and Middle East policy, Ambassador Ross worked closely with Secretaries of State James Baker, Warren Christopher, and Madeleine Albright. Prior to his service as special Middle East coordinator under President Clinton, Ambassador Ross served as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in the first Bush administration. During the Reagan administration, he served as director of Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council staff and deputy director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment. Ambassador Ross has published extensively on the former Soviet Union, arms control, and the greater Middle East, including *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* and *Statecraft, And How to Restore America's Standing in the World*.

DAVID ROTHKOPF is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council* and the *Architects of American Power*, has published numerous articles on America's role in the world, and directs the efforts of the Carnegie Economic Strategy Roundtable. His most recent book, *Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making*, examines the power of global elites, how they are shaping globalization and being shaped by it. In addition, he is president and CEO of Garten Rothkopf, an international advisory firm specializing in transformational trends worldwide, notably those associated with energy choice, climate change, security, and emerging markets. Previously, Rothkopf was founder, chairman, and CEO of Intellibridge, a firm offering open-source intelligence and advisory services on international issues, after serving for two years as managing director of Kissinger Associates. Rothkopf served as deputy under secretary of commerce for international trade policy in the Clinton administration. In this capacity, he played a central role in developing and directing the administration's groundbreaking Big Emerging Markets Initiative. Rothkopf came to the government after founding and serving as chairman and chief executive officer of International Media Partners, where he was editor and publisher of *CEO* magazine and *Emerging Markets* newspapers, and chairman of the CEO Institutes. He currently serves as Chairman of the National Strategic Investment Dialogue and as a member of the advisory boards of the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Center for Global Development, the Center for the Study of the Presidency and the Johns Hopkins/Bloomberg

School of Public Health. A prolific writer, he is the author of more than 150 articles on international themes for publications including *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Financial Times*, *Foreign Affairs*, and others. His next book, due out in 2010 from Farrar, Straus & Giroux, explores how the roles of the public and private sectors have changed in the global era and how this has impacted both the relationship between them and the conduct of global affairs.

JAMES P. RUBIN is currently an Adjunct Professor at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and a commentator and lecturer on U.S. foreign policy. Prior to joining Columbia, from October 2005 to October 2007, he was international news anchor and world affairs commentator for the London-based SKY news. While living in London he was also a Visiting Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics from 2001-2004, a partner in the Brunswick Group – a financial advisory firm – from 2001-2004, and in 2002 and 2003 the host of the PBS series *Wide Angle*, a primetime, weekly international affairs program. Mr. Rubin served under President Clinton as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Chief Spokesman for the State Department from 1997 to May 2000. He was also a top policy adviser to Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and served as a special negotiator during the Kosovo war to secure the demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army. During the 2004 election, Mr. Rubin served as Senior Adviser for National Security for the Kerry/Edwards Campaign. And in the 1996 election, Mr. Rubin was Director of Foreign Policy for the Clinton/Gore '96 Campaign. He has served as Senior Adviser and Spokesman for the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Madeline K. Albright (1993-1996), Professional Staff Member on the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (1989-1993).

MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center on Law and Security, security consultant, and author of the recently published *Crush the Cell* (Crown, 2008). He has had a distinguished and uniquely varied career in public service for over 30 years. He is best known for his work in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and law enforcement operations. Sheehan was the Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism at the NYPD from 2003 to 2006. Prior to this he was the Assistant Secretary General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN, where he was responsible for mission support to UN military and police peacekeeping forces around the world. In the late 1990s, Sheehan served as the Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International Organizations. He served at the White House under three National Security Advisors and two Presidents (George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton). Sheehan is a retired LTC of the U.S. Army Special Forces and was awarded the Combat Infantry Badge among other decorations for his service in the Army. He holds a B.S. from the United States Military Academy at West Point and an M.A. from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

FRANCES TOWNSEND is the Former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. She was appointed Homeland Security Advisor by the President on May 28th, 2004. In this capacity, Ms. Townsend chaired the Homeland Security Council and reported to the President on United States Homeland Security policy and Combating Terrorism matters. She

previously served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. Ms. Townsend came to the White House from the U. S. Coast Guard, where she had served as Assistant Commandant for Intelligence. Prior to that, she spent 13 years at the U. S. Department of Justice in a variety of senior positions, her last assignment as Counsel to the Attorney General for Intelligence Policy. Ms. Townsend began her prosecutorial career in 1985, serving as an Assistant District Attorney in Brooklyn, New York. In 1988, she joined the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York where she focused on international organized crime and white-collar crime cases. In 1991, she worked in the Office of the Attorney General to assist in establishing the newly created Office of International Programs, the predecessor to the Executive Office for National Security. In December 1993, she joined the Criminal Division where she served as Chief of Staff to the Assistant Attorney General and played a critical part in establishing the Division's international training and rule of law programs. From November of 1995 to November of 1997, Ms. Townsend was Director of the Office of International Affairs in the Criminal Division, which serves as the U. S. Central Authority for extradition and mutual legal assistance, and works with the Department of State in the negotiation of international law enforcement treaties. In November of 1997, Ms. Townsend was appointed as Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, where she oversaw international law enforcement and training matters in the Criminal Division, and acted as an advisor to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General on international law enforcement policy. In March of 1998, Ms. Townsend was appointed Counsel for Intelligence Policy, managing matters related to national security policy and operations for the Department of Justice.

STEFAN VERHULST is Chief of Research at the Markle Foundation. Prior to working at the Markle Foundation, Mr. Verhulst was the founder and director of the Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy (PCMLP) at Oxford University, as well as senior research fellow at the Centre for Socio Legal Studies. In that capacity he was appointed the socio-legal research fellow at Wolfson College (Oxford). In addition, he was the Unesco Chairholder in Communications Law and Policy for the UK. Before his move to Oxford in 1996, he had been a lecturer on communications law and policy issues in Belgium and founder and co-director of the International Media and info-comms Policy and Law studies (IMPS) at the School of Law, University of Glasgow. Mr. Verhulst has served as consultant to various international and national organizations including the Council of Europe, European Commission, Unesco, UNDP, USAID and DFID. His numerous publications include: *In Search of the Self: Conceptual Approaches to Internet Self Regulation* (Routledge, 2001), *Convergence in European Communications Regulation* (Blackstone, 1999), *EC Media Law and Policy* (AWL, 1998), *Legal Responses to the Changing Media* (OUP, 1998), and *Broadcasting Reform in India* (OUP, 1998). He is also the founder and editor of the *International Journal of Communications Law and Policy* and the *Communications Law in Transition* Newsletter.

MATTHEW WAXMAN is Associate Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, where he specializes in international law and national security law. He is also an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. He previously served at the U.S. Department of State as Principal Deputy

Director of Policy Planning (2005-2007). His prior government appointments included Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Director for Contingency Planning & International Justice at the National Security Council, and special assistant to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. He is a graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School and studied international relations as a Fulbright Scholar in the United Kingdom. After law school, he served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter and U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Joel M. Flaum. His publications include *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge University Press, 2002) (with D. Byman).

LEON WIESELTIER has been the literary editor of *The New Republic* since 1983. He was born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1952. After three years as a graduate student in Jewish history at Harvard University, he became a member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard from 1979 to 1982. He also attended Columbia University and Oxford University. He is the author of *Nuclear War Nuclear Peace*, *Against Identity*, and *Kaddish*.

Appendix B

RECENT REPORTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

Art, Robert J., G. John Ikenberry, Frederick W. Kagan, Barry R. Posen, Sarah Sewall, and Vikram J. Singh. *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*. Edited by Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2008.

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Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Bruce W. Jentleson, Ivo H. Daalder, Antony J. Blinken, Lael Brainard, Kurt M. Campbell, Michael A. McFaul, James C. O'Brien, Gayle E. Smith and James B. Steinberg. *Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2008.

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